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**MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION ECUADOR-PERU
(MOME) DOING A LOT WITH A LITTLE**

BY

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SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE FELLOWSHIP STUDY PROJECT

**MILITARY OBSERVER MISSION ECUADOR-PERU
(MOMEPE)**

Doing A Lot With a Little

by

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DEDICATION

SSG Xavier Ramirez

Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God.

San Mateo

Capitulo 5, Verso 9

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Kevin M. Higgins, LTC, USA
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This paper analyzes the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru, (MOMEPE) and recommends that it serve as a model for future peacekeeping operations. This multinational peacekeeping mission formed in response to the January 1995 border conflict. This small group of 100 peacekeepers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US, separated the belligerents, supervised demobilization, created a demilitarized zone, integrated former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and maintained a secure environment so diplomats could discuss the long-term resolution of the problem. MOMEPE, financed by the former belligerents, was small and cost effective, making it particularly attractive in times of fiscal and manpower constraints. The author argues that regional peacekeeping forces have advantages over traditional UN collective peacekeeping missions. He also argues that a small, multinational peacekeeping force can be effective when certain conditions are met: when the observer support base is built on a standing unit headquarters, and when the observer force is provided superior communications and mobility. Finally he argues that observer actions; observing strict impartiality, integrating former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and avoiding mission creep, are all key ingredients of success. The author stresses that the MOMEPE model is most appropriate for those peacekeeping missions resembling the MOMEPE environment--missions with a high level of consent designed to monitor an agreement (treaty, cease-fire accord).

INTRODUCTION¹

Peacekeeping, in all its various manifestations, is the great challenge of security policy in the post-Cold War world. It is not an optional extra, something that we may choose to do or refrain from doing. It is an integral part of doing business in this new security environment.

Joseph Kruzal

US Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy.²

Peacekeeping is here to stay. It is a frequent approach to international security problems. There have been 42 UN peace operations since 1945. Twenty-nine of these operations were created since 1988. Today there are 20 active peace operations. The demand for effective forces to conduct multinational peace enforcement in various trouble spots around the world far exceeds availability.³ The number of UN deployed peacekeepers rose from 11,500 in January 1992 to 72,150 in just two years.⁴ As we look out on the horizon, future peacekeeping operations seem to "be like buses: there will always be another one coming down the street."⁵

Annual UN peacekeeping costs for personnel and equipment reached an all time high of \$2.8 billion in 1995. Member states owe the UN a total of \$2.1 billion in current and back peacekeeping dues.⁶

Despite the huge investment in men and equipment, the success record of many peacekeeping operations has fallen short of expectations. Neither the United States or the UN has the resources--political, financial, or military-- to respond effectively and forcefully to even a majority of the security and humanitarian emergencies around the world.⁷

¹ The author served as first Commander, Joint Task Force Safe Border (February through August 1995). Joint Task Force Safe Border was the 72-man US support element (operations, communications, aviation, medical, weather, logistics) based in Patuca, Ecuador that supported the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP).

² Joseph Kruzal, "Peacekeeping and the Partnership for Peace," In Peace Support Operations and the US Military, ed. Dennis Quinn (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994): 93.

³ Kruzal, 96.

⁴ Angela Kane, "Other Selected States: Motivations and Factors in National Choices," In Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, eds. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 120.

⁵ Christopher Layne, "Minding Our Own Business: The Case for American Non-Participation in International Peacekeeping/Peacemaking Operations," In Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, eds. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 90.

⁶ United Nations. "Frequently Asked Questions." URL: <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/faq.htm>>, accessed 5 May 1997.

⁷ Edward C. Luck, "The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace Operations," In Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, eds. Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995): 68.

In the midst of endless peacekeeping responsibilities there is a bright spot. The mission that Army leaders have described as “the most successful peacekeeping operation in history,”⁸ the Military Observer Mission Ecuador Peru (MOMEPE).⁹

This multinational peacekeeping mission was formed in response to the January 1995 border conflict. This small group of 100 peacekeepers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US, deployed to the conflictive zone, separated the belligerents, supervised demobilization to pre-war strengths, created a demilitarized zone, integrated the former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and maintained a secure environment allowing diplomats the time to discuss the peaceful resolution of the problem.

SOUTHCOM Commander-in Chief GEN Barry McCaffrey says that “the multinational MOMEPE will become a ‘data point’ in history, serving as a model for a new, more effective type of peace operation to be used again in similar situations.”¹⁰ Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi, said MOMEPE showed that “done right, multilateral cooperation on sensitive security issues is possible.”¹¹ Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote that MOMEPE is “one example of the historic opportunities that now exist for the Nations of the Western Hemisphere to build stable bridges of communication, cooperation, and trust that increase the security of our neighborhood.”¹²

MOMEPE--small, casualty-free, and cost-effective--revealed that not every humanitarian response has to be a drain on limited resources. MOMEPE demonstrated that there are effective ways of meeting international obligations in a more frugal manner. This is particularly attractive at a time when the US must operate under financial and manpower constraints.

Given the consensus that MOMEPE was a successful peacekeeping operation, three important questions emerge: First, why was this mission successful? Second, how was MOMEPE able to accomplish the mission with such a small force? Finally, what lessons can be applied to future peacekeeping operations?

I argue in this paper that regional peacekeeping forces have advantages over traditional UN collective peacekeeping forces. I argue that small can be effective when the Observer group has autonomy, when there is close coordination between diplomatic and military components of the mission, and when the peacekeeping support base provides superior communications and mobility and is built on a standing unit headquarters. Finally, I argue that correct peacekeeper behavior: observing strict impartiality, integrating former belligerents into the peacekeeping force, and avoiding mission creep, are key ingredients of success.

⁸ Jane McHugh, “Success in the South American Jungles,” Army Times, 12 August 1996, p.10.

⁹ Acronym is the same in Spanish (Mision de Observadores Militares, Ecuador-Peru MOMEPE).

¹⁰ Stacy Evers, “Peru and Ecuador: Marking Out Their Boundaries in Peace,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 10 October 1995, p.31.

¹¹ Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi, “Security and Democracy in the Region,” In Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1996, p.72. Ambassador Einaudi is a senior policy advisor to the Secretary of State and served as US permanent representative to the Organization of American States from 1989-93. Since January 1995 he has also been the US Special Envoy in negotiations to settle the Peru-Ecuador border conflict.

¹² Secretary of Defense William Perry, “Good Bridges Make Good Neighbors,” In Joint Force Quarterly, no.11, Spring 96, p.40.

This paper is important because the answers to these questions will reveal procedures that will serve as a template to be applied toward future peacekeeping operations, particularly those operations that resemble the MOMEP environment.¹³ The MOMEP environment is a traditional peacekeeping environment defined as “military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, etc.) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement.”¹⁴ In addition, the MOMEP model is most appropriate for resolving conflicts where belligerents are interstate actors.

The MOMEP model is not appropriate for more proactive Peace Enforcement¹⁵ missions (Somalia, Bosnia). Nor is it directly applicable to peace operations deployed to resolve civil conflicts that include substate actors (El Salvador, Angola). Planners of these type peace operations, however, will find some features in the MOMEP model that can be applied to these environments.

This paper is composed of five sections. In the first section I review the background and events leading up to, and including, the employment of MOMEP. In the second section, I look at MOMEP as a Regional Peacekeeping Organization. In the third section I discuss Joint Task Force Safe Border and supporting MOMEP, and in the fourth section I talk about MOMEP functional issues, including achieving impartiality, verifying compliance, force protection, and avoiding mission creep. In the final section I consider the future of the Conflict, the future of MOMEP, and draw conclusions from the MOMEP operation.

¹³ The Joint Warfighting Center's, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, Ft Monroe, Virginia: Joint Warfighting Center, 28 February 1995, p.1, says, “There is no standard peace operations mission. Each peace operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.” I argue that although each peace operation is unique, all have common features. I contend that past peace operations provide templates for future operations, particularly where environments are similar. There is no single correct “cookie cutter” approach to peacekeeping, but the study of past operations is beneficial to planners.

¹⁴ Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, p.GL-7.

¹⁵ Peace Enforcement: “Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order,” from JTF Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations, p.GL-7.

SECTION I BACKGROUND

*Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have
a clear beginning or a decisive resolution.*

Peace Operations, FM 100-23¹⁶

In this section I discuss the historical events leading up to the January 1995 Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict and the employment of the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE) through May 1997.¹⁷

Roots of the Peru-Ecuador Conflict.

The Ecuador-Peru rivalry pre-dates the Spanish Colonial period. In 1526 the Inca King, Huayna Capac, divided his empire between his two sons, Huascar and Atahualpa. Huascar, the Inca of Cuzco (Peru), went to war with his brother the Ecuadoran Inca, Atahualpa over a territorial quarrel.¹⁸

During the Spanish Colonial period, the frontier disputes continued due to the imprecise division between the Audiencia of Quito and the Vice-Royalty of Peru. Following independence from Spain in 1822, boundary problems persisted as Peru and Ecuador maintained competing claims over the same territory. These competing claims

¹⁶ US Department of the Army, Peace Operations, Field Manual 100-23, Washington DC: Department of the Army, December 1994, p.18.

¹⁷ For background information on events leading up to, and including, the 1941 Peru-Ecuador Border War and the 1942 Rio Protocol, I refer readers to Bryce Wood's, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932-1942, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966): 255-344. Another source for background information on the Peru-Ecuador controversy through 1986 is found in William L. Krieg's Ecuadorean-Peruvian Rivalry in the Upper Amazon, Department of State External Research Program, 2nd Edition: 1986. Also, Dr. Gabriel Marcella's recent work provides analysis on latest border incident in War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic Implications for the United States and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War. US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 24 November 1995 and

For a first-hand account of MOMEPE operations, I refer readers to Colonel Glenn R. Weidner's "Operation Safe Border: The Peru-Ecuador Crisis" in Joint Force Quarterly, no.11, Spring 1996: 52-58. An expanded version of this article is found in COL Weidner's "Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley: A Regional Response to Crisis." This paper was presented at the University of Miami's North-South Center Conference on "Peacemaking and Democratization in the Hemisphere, Multilateral Approaches," 11-13 April 1996. COL Weidner served as first Commander, US Contingent, Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE), 10 February through 28 August 1995. As Commander, US Contingent, COL Weidner was the senior US representative in MOMEPE and commanded all US Observers as well as the US support element, Joint Task Force Safe Border.

The MOMEPE II After Action Review (22 August - 20 March 1995), United States Contingent, Patuca, Ecuador, assembled by COL Mark Fee, the second Commander, US Contingent MOMEPE, provides good background information on MOMEPE II and JTF Safe Border organization and operations

LTC William H. Northacker of the USSOCOM History Office traveled to Patuca, Ecuador in August 1995 and compiled Operation Safe Border, Multinational Observer Mission, Ecuador-Peru I, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: US Special Operations Command History and Research Office, September 1995.

¹⁸ Lonely Planet Guide to Ecuador, p.14.

resulted in 175 years of discord between Lima and Quito, leading to armed conflict on several occasions.¹⁹

The 1941 Peru-Ecuador War.

The 1941 Peru-Ecuador War is key to the understanding of the 1995 conflict. Lack of mutually accepted boundaries triggered the conflict. In July 1941, a 16,000 man Peruvian Army equipped with modern tanks and airplanes overwhelmed a poorly equipped, 8,000 man Ecuadoran Army. The Peruvian Army secured large areas of Ecuadoran territory. In January 1942, a peace agreement was brokered by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US, who were holding a hemispheric conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil at the time.²⁰

The Rio Protocol of 1942.

The Rio Protocol was meant to settle the border dispute quickly. The cease-fire halted the Peruvian march and the new border described in the Rio Protocol recognized Peruvian advances at the time of the cease-fire. Ecuador, in danger of losing even more territory, agreed to the Treaty. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US were designated the Guarantors of the Rio Protocol and pledged to assist in the execution of the treaty and in the marking of the new frontier.²¹

Marking the Border 1943-1947.²²

Marking the border was a formidable challenge. The border area is characterized by remote, rugged topography, drenched in heavy rains and covered with thick jungle. Despite these difficulties, the joint demarcation commission placed border markers along 1600 kms, or 95 percent, of the border.

A major problem emerged when the marking party reached the Condor Mountain Range. At this point the Rio Protocol indicates that the border be marked along the "Divortium Aquarum," or watershed, between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers. The marking party found not one, but two watersheds between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers. They discovered a heretofore unknown river, the 200 kilometer long Cenepa

¹⁹ Marcella, p.4.

²⁰ The 1942 Rio Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held to organize hemispheric unity against the Axis Powers, see Jack Child, Geopolitics in South America. (New York: Praeger, 1985): 93.

²¹ The Rio Protocol of 1942, the "Protocol of Peace, Friendship, and Boundaries Between Peru and Ecuador, 29 January 1942." There were nine articles in the protocol. Pertinent to the current situation are Articles V, VII, and IX. Article V states that "the activity of the US, Argentina, Brazil and Chile shall continue until the definite demarcation of the frontiers between Peru and Ecuador has been completed, this protocol and the execution thereof being under the guaranty of the four countries mentioned at the beginning of this article," Article VII states that, "Any doubt or disagreement which may arise in the execution of this protocol shall be settled by the parties concerned, with the assistance of the representatives of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in the shortest possible time." These articles have caused the four "Guarantors" of the treaty to respond to border disputes several times in the last 55 years, the latest being the current MOMEPA mission.

²² Article VIII, Rio Protocol of 1942, provides instructions on how the boundary line shall be drawn. The boundary line is marked along geographic features: rivers, river intersections, ridge lines. There are 16 segments noted.

River, running between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers. This created two water divides, one between the Cenepa and the Zamora and the other between the Cenepa and the Santiago. Ecuador claimed this discrepancy made the Rio Protocol "unexecutable" as written.²³

In 1945, however, Brazilian Naval Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar ruled that the border would be marked along the most prominent watershed, the Condor Mountain Range (between the Zamora and the Cenepa Rivers). This ruling favored Peru. Had the ruling favored Ecuador, they would have gained the Cenepa headwaters, but more importantly, access to the Amazon River, since the Cenepa River flows into the Marañon and Marañon on into the Amazon.

Two years later, in 1947, a US Air Force aerial photo survey of the border was completed, confirming the existence of the Cenepa River. Ecuador claimed these photos refuted the Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar ruling.²⁴ Peru, on the other hand, said the USAF photo survey only corroborated the Dias de Aguiar ruling.²⁵ Frustrated, Ecuador suspended the marking of the border in 1947, leaving the 78 kilometer stretch near the Condor Mountain Range and the Upper Cenepa unmarked.

In 1960 Ecuador completely rejected the Rio Protocol and said it should be nullified. Ecuador felt the Protocol had been imposed by force, signed under duress while Peruvian troops occupied their territory. Ecuador reasserted claims over former Ecuadoran territory. Peru, on the other hand, felt their position was firmly supported by the 1942 Rio Protocol, the 1945 arbitration decision, the 1947 US Air Force aerial survey, and documents issued after the 1981 conflict.²⁶

During the last 35 years, Ecuador made several attempts to establish jungle outposts in the disputed areas on the Peruvian side of the unmarked Rio Protocol line. Numerous armed clashes have taken place in the contested area, most notably in 1981 and 1991 as Peru tried to dislodge the Ecuadorans. The Guarantors responded on three occasions, reaffirming their Rio Protocol responsibilities. However, as long as this 78

²³ Ecuador claims the Cenepa River was unknown at the time of the Rio Protocol of 1942, and was discovered only at the time of the border marking. The remoteness of the region makes this conceivable. Peru disputes Ecuador's claim that the Cenepa was "discovered" and cites several reasons why Ecuador would have known about the existence of the Cenepa in "Belaunde: Unfounded Claim: Historical Background," *Caretas*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 February 1995, p.71. Nonetheless, the drafters of the Protocol seem to have been unaware of the Cenepa, since they failed to take the river into account when drawing up the boundary landmarks, inadvertently initiating 55 years of controversy and conflict. See also the Peruvian Government's "The Peruvian-Ecuadorian Border Incident in the Cordillera Del Condor--1981," In URL:<<http://web.maxwell.syr.edu/nativew...raphy/latinam/ecuador/border1.html>>, accessed 02 January 1996.

²⁴ Ecuadorans contend Captain Braz Dias de Aguiar could not have made an informed ruling, since the USAF photography of the area was not completed until 1947, two years after his ruling. In "Origins of Border Conflict," *Guayaquil Expreso*, in FBIS, Latin America, 7 February 1995, p.36. See also Ecuadoran Foreign relations Minister Galo Leoro in "Rio Protocol Cannot Be Executed," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 23 May 1995, p.39.

²⁵ Peruvian Deputy Foreign Minister Eduardo Ponce in "Ecuadoran Claims of Rio Protocol 'Faults' Denied," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 19 May 1995, p.28.

²⁶ "Fujimori Not To Give 'An Inch' of Territory," in *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 3 May 1995, p.41.

kilometer stretch of border remained unmarked, there existed a danger of renewed clashes.

The January 1995 Undeclared Border War.

Admitting error and cutting your losses is rare with individuals, unknown with states.

Barbara Tuchman

Distant Mirror

In 1991, Ecuadoran army patrols began moving into the remote Upper Cenepa jungle, on the Peruvian side of the Rio Protocol line, establishing small base camps and helicopter landing zones. The Ecuadoran patrols became a permanent presence in the area, forging solid relationships with the Shuar Indian inhabitants.

Peru neglected to patrol this border area adequately. Peru was embroiled in a major counterinsurgency campaign against the Sendero Luminoso and the MRTA. President Fujimori was also focused on consolidating his domestic political power.

In January 1995, Peru turned their attention to this northeast border area. Peru asked the Ecuadoran detachments to return to their side of the Rio Protocol line. Ecuador refused, claiming their base camps were on Ecuadoran soil. Peru moved patrols into Upper Cenepa to reestablish a presence.²⁷

On January 9, 1995, Ecuadoran and Peruvian patrols stumbled into each other in the dense jungle terrain and gunfire was exchanged. This and subsequent clashes led to the full-scale mobilization of both the Ecuadoran and Peruvian Armed Forces. With patriotic fervor, the 60,000 man Ecuadoran Army and 90,000 man Peruvian Army forward deployed along the entire length of their common border.

Ecuador moved 3,000 soldiers and Peru moved 2,000 soldiers into the ten by ten kilometer Upper Cenepa flashpoint. Over the next three weeks the Peruvians tried to dislodge the Ecuadorans from their Cenepa jungle bases. Peru employed fighter-bombers, armed helicopter gunships, and indirect fire weapons without much success. The belligerents became intermixed in seesaw battles fought over the rough, savage terrain. After 19 days of fighting, Ecuador suffered 27 killed and 89 wounded, Peru 46 killed and 214 wounded. Peru lost six aircraft.²⁸

Although Ecuador enjoyed a tactical advantage in the Cenepa, the fighting reached a stalemate. Neither side wanted the conflict to escalate outside the confines of the Cenepa, yet neither side wanted to abandon their positions. The political, economic, and human costs were becoming too great to continue. It was clear that no side would emerge victorious.

²⁷ News Digest for January 1995, "Fighting on Peru-Ecuador Border," Facts on File, World News Digest with Index, p. 40356.

²⁸ Official reports quoted in News Digest for February 1995, "Fighting on Peru-Ecuador Border-- Diplomatic Moves," Facts on File, World News Digest with Index, p.40404. There was no independent confirmation of these figures due to the remoteness of the region.

The Itamaraty²⁹ Peace Declaration, 17 February 1995.

As soon as the fighting erupted, the Guarantors acted quickly. Meeting in Brasilia, they conducted weeks of tough negotiations. Finally on 17 February, 1995, the Deputy Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru along with representatives of the four Guarantor countries, signed the Peace Declaration at the Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia, the capital of Brazil. President Duran Ballen of Ecuador took a big step by agreeing to recognize the Rio Protocol as a "basis" for a solution to the conflict.³⁰ Under the Declaration of Itamaraty Peru and Ecuador agreed:

1. To accept the Guarantor countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, US) offer to send a team of observers on a renewable 90-day mission to monitor the cease-fire, the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEPE).
2. To separate immediately the forces in confrontation. That no new deployments will be made into the confrontation area. The parties will create conditions for the observers to verify compliance.
3. To ask the observer mission to recommend "an area that should be completely demilitarized."
4. That the parties would provide support
5. To begin immediately a "gradual and mutual demobilization."
6. To begin talks with a view to finding a solution to the existing deadlock.

Although the Itamaraty Declaration did not resolve the underlying causes of the border dispute, in Point #6 the former belligerents did agree to hold conversations on the "prevailing impasses" in the border region.³¹

MOMEPE I (12 March 1995 - 21 August 1995).

MOMEPE's departure for the border was delayed three weeks due to continued cease-fire violations in the Cenepa. On 28 February 1995, the belligerents met again in Montevideo, Uruguay and reiterated their commitment to the cease-fire, agreeing to accept the "immediate presence of observers" from the Rio Guarantors.³²

MOMEPE arrived in the conflictive zone on 12 March 1995. The 112-man organization was headed by a Brazilian Lieutenant General, the "Coordinator General." Each Guarantor country (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US) contributed a 10 man observer contingent headed by a Colonel. The US also provided a 72 man support element (US Joint Task Force Safe Border) that supported MOMEPE in the areas of

²⁹ The Itamaraty Palace in Brasilia is the headquarters of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry where the declaration was signed.

³⁰ This was an important point since Ecuador declared in 1960 that the Protocol was "null" and "unexecutable," claiming it was imposed by force in 1942 while Peruvian troops occupied their territory. Duran said that the treaty was now "in effect" and he limited the area of "inexecutability" to the 78 kilometer border area that remains unmarked. Duran's acceptance of the Rio Protocol legalized the Declaration of Itamaraty and gave the MOMEPE Observers official status in Ecuador. In "Poll: Majority Support Duran-Ballen's Recognition of the Rio Protocol," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 February 1995, p.81.

³¹ News Digest for February 1995, "Peru, Ecuador Sign Truce; Border Dispute Unresolved," Facts on File, World News Digest with Index

³² News Digest for February 1995, "Fighting on Peru-Ecuador Border--Diplomatic Moves," p.40404.

operations, intelligence/information, administration/logistics, communications and aviation.

MOMEPE quickly established a four phase operation to bring the situation under control. MOMEPE placed a 20 by 20 km Security Zone around the conflictive area in the Cenepa and launched observers into the zone to monitor the cease-fire. The MOMEPE observers, in careful coordination with the belligerents, separated the 3,000 Ecuadoran and 2,000 Peruvian combatants from the difficult jungle terrain in the Security Area. MOMEPE observer teams attended demobilization ceremonies throughout Peru and Ecuador, as belligerent forces returned to pre-war strengths. The observer force continued to verify compliance through aerial patrols and observer operations. Finally, the MOMEPE staff played a key role in Peru-Ecuador negotiations leading to the establishment of a permanent Demilitarized Zone in the disputed area on 1 August 1995.

MOMEPE II³³ (22 August 1995 - 22 March 1996).

In the next six months, MOMEPE II focused on three areas: verification, integration and confidence building measures. MOMEPE II continued to verify, through observer operations and aerial patrols, compliance with the DMZ agreement. Integration was accomplished by introducing observers from the former belligerents into MOMEPE II while gradually reducing Guarantor presence.

Confidence Building Measures, such as cross-border meetings of unit commanders, telephone hotlines, and standard border patrol procedures, created an atmosphere of trust.

The MOMEPE II staff also implemented another security area, Zone Alpha. This 20 km x 5 km security zone, located 50 kms northeast of the DMZ, was put into effect to eliminate the multiple cease-fire violations near a disputed border marker. Once in effect, there were no further incidents.

MOMEPE's Second Year (23 March 1996 - 31 May 1997).

MOMEPE's verification, integration, and confidence building measures continued. As peace endured, MOMEPE's routine operations gave the diplomats time to discuss the long term resolution of the border dispute. A diplomatic breakthrough occurred with the opening of the bilateral talks on the "prevailing impasses" on 15 April 1997. This marked the first time in 47 years that the two countries have engaged in formal discussions on the border issue.³⁴ Current MOMEPE operations allow these bilateral talks to continue, in a peaceful and productive way.

³³ COL Fee, MOMEPE II AAR, p.3.

³⁴ COL Leo Rios, J5 SOUTHCOM, telephone interview, 13 May 1997.

SECTION II MOMEPE, A REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION

Regionalism is the key to world order. Regional cooperation is the building block for broader global cooperation.

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi
US Special Envoy to Peru-Ecuador Negotiations³⁵

For the most of the postwar period, regional organizations did not play a very effective role in intraregional conflict management. Regional politics and lack of internal cohesion within these bodies all too often neutralized or hampered these efforts. By the mid-1980s the traditional regional organizations were considered to be little more than moribund institutions suffering from terminal paralysis. The original vision of regionalism as a building block to world order enshrined in the UN Charter did not come about.

Cadieux³⁶.

Regional organizations have mixed reviews. The UN would prefer that regional organizations take the lead, or share the burden, in crisis response. The UN Charter asks member countries to first “make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional arrangements before referring them to the UN Security Council.”³⁷

In practice, however, regional organizations have drawbacks. Paul Diehl in International Peacekeeping says interested third parties from the region stifle reconciliation when those states try to serve their own interests in promoting a solution to the conflict. Diehl says it is often preferable to form peacekeeping forces with troops from neutral countries that have little or no stake in the conflict.³⁸

MOMEPE, a peacekeeping mission composed entirely of countries from within the region, did succeed. Instead of an obstacle, MOMEPE’s regionality was a source of strength.

In this section, I argue that MOMEPE shows potential as a regional alternative to UN collective peacekeeping. MOMEPE’s homogeneity, exceptional autonomy, and close working relationship with the diplomatic effort, makes MOMEPE a regional peacekeeping

³⁵ Luigi Einaudi, “Western Hemisphere Security: Cautions on New Military Missions,” in *Peace Support Operations and the US Military*, ed., Dennis J. Quinn (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1994): 125.

³⁶ Cadieux, INTERNET.

³⁷ Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the UN Charter.

³⁸ Diehl, p.100. The Uruguayan Executive Branch, for example, stated recently, “Uruguay will not get involved in any peace mission in American territory. Uruguay will only go to those regions in which they have no political, economic or religious interests.” Fifty percent of the Uruguayan Army has peacekeeping experience, in “Uruguay: No Peacekeeping Troops to be Sent to Ecuador-Peru Border.” *Montevideo La Manana*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 February 1995, p.74

organization that is much more than a “moribund institution suffering from terminal paralysis.”

MOMEPE is Homogenous.

When forces with fundamental differences work together, the potential for confusion is massive. Variety of backgrounds slows the process as well as creates opportunities for errors.

DR David S. Alberts and DR Richard Hayes
Command Arrangements for Peace Operations³⁹

Peacekeeping missions formed by countries from outside the region may guarantee neutrality, but this neutrality comes at a cost. MOMEPE’s shared cultural, historical, linguistic, religious beliefs, military training, and political systems make it easy for the Guarantor observers from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the US to find common ground with each other, and more importantly, with the former belligerents, Peru and Ecuador.

The MOMEPE observers came to the mission with an in-depth understanding of the historical background of the conflict and the politico-military situation. The learning curve was not steep. Many MOMEPE observers had visited the belligerent countries on military to military exchanges or as tourists. Chile and Brazil shared a common border with Peru. Argentina shared common borders with Chile and Brazil. Military and technical competence, organization, doctrine, protocol, and terminology were comparable among Guarantors and belligerents. MOMEPE’s entry level situational awareness was key to their success.

Like many peacekeeping operations, MOMEPE arrived late to the combat zone. Tension was high, a tenuous cease-fire in effect, and the belligerents remained locked and intermingled on the dense jungle battlefield. With informed intuition, MOMEPE quickly developed sound plans that respected belligerent sensitivities. MOMEPE’s intimate knowledge of the situation gave them the ability to foresee the future and take steps to influence the course of events to prevent undesirable outcomes.

The US as a Latin American “Regional Partner” in MOMEPE.

Today, as the only genuinely global power, the United States is the only country in the world that is part of every region.

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi
US Special Envoy to Peru-Ecuador Negotiations⁴⁰

As the only MOMEPE actor not from South America, the United States Contingent was not the “odd man out.” Instead, proper personnel selection made the US Contingent

³⁹ DR David S. Alberts and Richard Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995): 100

⁴⁰ Einaudi, “Western Hemisphere Security: Cautions on New Military Missions,” p.125.

as regionally qualified, and in some cases more regionally qualified, than their Latin American counterparts.

The US Observers, and the bulk of the JTF Safe Border staff, were from the 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This Special Force unit conducts over 80 deployments a year to 14 Latin American Countries. Many of MOMEF's 7th Special Forces Group soldiers worked on combined training exercises in the past with the former belligerents and the Guarantor countries. These Special Forces soldiers conduct extensive language training and area studies as part of routine training.

JTF Safe Border's aviation element, from the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, Howard Air Force Base, Panama, had several bilingual pilots with extensive flying experience in the region.

Most significantly, the Commanders, US Contingent MOMEF were products of the US Army Latin American Foreign Area Officer program. Both COL Glenn Weidner, MOMEF I, and COL Mark Fee, MOMEF II, were serving Commanders of US Military Groups in Honduras and El Salvador, respectively, when called for the mission.

"Critical moments often produce men to match the need."⁴¹ The careers of COL Weidner and COL Fee seem to have been in preparation for this "critical moment." COL Weidner attended both the US Army School of the Americas Command and General Staff College and the InterAmerican Defense College. These year-long courses, conducted entirely in Spanish, include extensive contact with officers from all of Latin America. As a former Spanish Language Professor at the United States Military Academy, COL Weidner's Spanish was flawless. COL Weidner was also assigned to the USMILGP, Chile. This previous association with Chile was the basis for the superb relations the US enjoyed with the Chilean Observer Contingent throughout the mission.

COL Weidner felt the job that most prepared him for his role as peacekeeper, was SOUTHCOM Exercise Officer 1986-88, where he learned to apply tact, diplomacy, patience, and consensus-building, in planning and executing several major multinational exercises in Latin America. Throughout MOMEF I, COL Weidner would draw heavily on those skills to develop MOMEF operations plans and DMZ proposals.

Spanish: MOMEF's Official Language.

All MOMEF internal and external business is done in Spanish. MOMEF meetings, radio transmissions, and official correspondence were in Spanish. The Portuguese-speaking Brazilians are understood with little difficulty, and many Brazilian observers are fluent in Spanish and English. Most US personnel have formal Spanish training at the Defense Language Institute or are native speakers.

The impact of a common language on the efficiency and the effectiveness of MOMEF cannot be understated. Operations, diplomacy, and negotiations are simplified and accelerated, misunderstandings minimized. First hand, face to face exchanges, are conducted at the highest level Superior Consultative Committee meetings down to the lowest level observer outpost in the jungle.

How something is said, can be more important than what is said. When negotiating difficult and sensitive issues, indirect, circuitous, or evasive language is often

⁴¹ Barbara Tuchman, Distant Mirror.

employed. The MOMEPE observers read the meaning couched behind these statements. All dialogue is placed in its cultural context, and nonverbal signals are easily picked up. MOMEPE communicated at a depth that gave the protagonists a sense that their side was being heard.

This same effect could not be achieved through interpreters.

MOMEPE's Attitude Toward the Belligerents.

MOMEPE treated the former belligerents with trust, confidence and respect; as partners in the push for peace. They were not considered delinquents for coming to blows in the border dispute, but as fellow military professionals swept up in an unfortunate chain of events.

MOMEPE's approach did not prevent the Brazilian Coordinator General from issuing firm reprimands when the situation called for it. Nor were his reprimands taken lightly by the belligerents.

MOMEPE's positive treatment of the belligerents was mirrored, resulting in good cooperation from the parties. The Peruvian and Ecuadoran Liaison (LNO) Elements to MOMEPE, headed by General Mora Zevallos and General Cesar Duran Abad, respectively, provided valuable planning information. MOMEPE used the LNO teams as "windows" into the belligerent forces, pre-testing operational plans to gain insights on perceptions and stumbling blocks. As a result, MOMEPE's plans were well-conceived and generally accepted by the parties.

This record of cooperation with the belligerent forces paved the way for the integration of Peruvian and Ecuadoran Observers into the MOMEPE organization.

Integration of Peruvians and Ecuadorans

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of MOMEPE II was that it stressed integration, as opposed to separation of the belligerent forces. The hope is that following the development of a reasonable degree of mutual confidence between the parties, the endless cycle of border disputes can be broken."

Colonel Mark Fee

US Contingent Commander, MOMEPE II⁴²

When integration was first proposed, the parties were dead-set against it. Some military officers felt "integration" would be possible, but only if Peruvian observers stayed in Peru, and Ecuadoran observers stayed in Ecuador.

As months went by, the smoke settled on the battlefield and integration became more palatable. In November 1995, MOMEPE stipulated that renewal of the Guarantor observer mission would be contingent on the parties accepting full integration⁴³ The parties accepted.

⁴² Colonel Mark Fee, MOMEPE II, After Action Review (AAR) 22 August - 20 March 1995, United States Contingent, Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru, Patuca, Ecuador, p.2.

⁴³ Paragraph 9 of the MOMEPE II Terms of Reference (TOR) requires that "the parties will coordinate the opportune integration of officers from their Armed Forces to gradually replace the military observers from the Guarantor Countries, which number could be progressively reduced provided that an appropriate

Peruvian and Ecuadoran observers, now fully absorbed into MOMEPE, began moving freely through their former adversaries military outposts and installations. Instead of the breach in security that was feared, the parties perceived great value in having transparency of operations. Rumors of troop buildups were quickly dispelled when their observer representatives arrived on the scene. This "ground truth" brought stability to the border.

The Peruvian and Ecuadoran observers themselves developed bonds of trust. Peruvian observers were billeted with Ecuadoran Observers. Working side by side, they saw they had much in common.

Integration was "another clear sign of the high degree of confidence reached between Ecuador and Peru."⁴⁴ Yet, the parties would not have taken this first step on their own. MOMEPE's cultural awareness gave them the finesse to convince the parties that integration was in their best interest.

US Troops under Foreign Command.

I have serious doubts about the wisdom of placing American troops under the operational command of foreign military personnel. The US Armed Forces are the best trained, best equipped, most effective fighting force in the world. Our troops deserve the best leadership which is provided more often than not by American officers. This is not arrogance or elitism; it is a simple fact.

Senator John McCain
Republican, Arizona⁴⁵

There are many instances when it is not US leadership that is required, but simply its cooperation and support.

Dent Ocaya-Lakidi
Senior Fellow, Africa Program, International Peace Academy⁴⁶

Placing US troops under foreign command is controversial. MOMEPE was no exception. During the Declaration of Itamaraty talks, Brazil offered to provide a General as Commander of MOMEPE. This became a major point of discussion among the

presence is maintained to better fulfill its objectives. The pace of said integration and downsizing will be determined by consensus of the Superior Consultative Committee, in accordance with existing situation and the level of confidence achieved by the parties."

⁴⁴ "Details of MOMEPE Consultative Committee Meeting Disclosed," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 20 November 1995, p.54.i

⁴⁵ Senator John McCain, "The Proper United States Role in Peacemaking," in Peace Support Operations and the US Military (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1994): 91.

⁴⁶ Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, "UN and the US Military Roles in Regional Organizations," in Peace Support Operations and the US Military (Washington DC: National Defense University, 1994): 164.

Guarantor participants. It was decided that the Brazilian General would not be called Commander, but "Coordinator General."

The Brazilian General would have operational control (OPCON) over the observers of all four Guarantor nations. The Contingent Commander from each country, a Colonel, would have command less OPCON over his observer contingent. In addition, the US Colonel, COL Weidner, would have command and OPCON over the support element, JTF Safe Border.⁴⁷ The US forces command line went from COL Weidner through CINCSOUTHCOM to the National Command Authority.

Although the Brazilian Coordinator General's title was watered down, the Guarantor Observer Contingents recognized and fully supported him as the MOMEPE Commander. The four parallel administrative chains of command were kept low key. This command relationship gave MOMEPE "Unity of Command," something difficult to achieve in multinational operations.

The Brazilian Coordinator Generals have been successful for two reasons. First, they have provided credible and competent leadership, employing time-tested leadership principles. Observers from all six countries felt their welfare was being looked after. Second, the Brazilian General's leadership has never been put to the "tough test."⁴⁸ Although the Observer mission was far from risk free, the Brazilian Coordinator General has not had to give orders that would put his observers seriously in harm's way. MOMEPE has suffered no casualties to date. Casualties put a strain on multinational organizations.

Brazil in the Lead: Burden Sharing.

The US supplies the preponderance of forces and resources in MOMEPE. Yet Brazil is in the lead. There are two advantages to this relationship.

The first advantage is that Brazil's leadership gives MOMEPE a marked regional flavor. US leadership would give MOMEPE an overwhelming unilateral US stamp, defeating the purpose of the regional effort. Belligerents would interpret MOMEPE decisions as "US decisions." MOMEPE internal business could also be complicated if the regional Guarantors lined up against the US. Brazil in the lead gives MOMEPE balance.

The second advantage is that Brazil assumes a major portion of the peacekeeping burden by assuming the leadership role. Leadership is not fun. Brazil deserves much of the credit for MOMEPE's success, but they assume a greater portion of risk if the mission fails. By far, Brazil has made the biggest investment in the diplomatic effort. Brazil hosted the initial Itamaraty Declaration talks, numerous follow-up meetings, and is

⁴⁷ Weidner, "Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley: A Regional Response to Crisis," p.5-7.

⁴⁸ In the very first days of MOMEPE, COL Weidner describes in "Peacekeeping in Upper Cenepa Valley," pp. 9-11, an initial challenge to the authority of the Brazilian General, that could have potentially damaged observer cohesion. The US precondition for initiating observer operations into the conflictive zone was to have a DMZ in effect. However, LTG Candido Vargas de Freire (Coordinator General) and the Brazilian Foreign Ministry wanted to initiate observer operations immediately. They believed that a DMZ was months away from being negotiated (it would in fact be more than four months away—1 August 1995). LTG Freire ordered the first MOMEPE observer mission into the conflictive zone without the US contingent. COL Weidner in discussions with Ambassador Einaudi, US Special Envoy and GEN McCaffrey (USCINCSO) was able to modify the US position to allow US observer participation without a DMZ, successfully averting a crisis in the command relationships.

currently hosting the bilateral talks on the “prevailing impasses.” Brazil provides a LTG and two Colonels to MOMEPE year-round. Brazil recently volunteered to relieve the US of the MOMEPE support element mission and they are coordinating for the purchase of UH60 Blackhawk helicopters.

Since the Rio Protocol of 1942, Brazil has felt a special responsibility to the Peru-Ecuador issue. In the 1990s Brazil is assuming an even wider leadership role, heading peacekeeping missions to Angola and Mozambique and the multinational demining effort in Central America.

The Executors are the Planners.

Many peacekeepers inherit plans that are written “from afar.” The MOMEPE I staff was fortunate. Prior to deploying to the conflictive zone, they rallied in Brasilia to help write their own mandate, definition of procedures and terms of reference. This had four advantages. First, the MOMEPE staff had a sharp mental focus, knowing they would live with the consequences of their planning for six months. Second, there is pride in authorship. Third, the MOMEPE staff knew what was expected of them when arrived in the conflictive zone. Finally, once the mission was underway there were fewer discussions on the interpretation of the mandate, since most were present during the its genesis.

MOMEPE’s entry level experience overcame the disadvantage of not having established records, SOPs, or organizational memory. Several MOMEPE observers had prior peacekeeping experience. Colonel Jorge Gomez Pola (Argentina) served in Lebanon, CPT Valdecir (Brazil) worked in the UN mission to Angola, and LTC Pedro Lovera (Chile) was assigned as an observer in Kashmir province. Their experiences gave MOMEPE a starting point for establishing methods, procedures, and structures for the peacekeeping operation.

MOMEPE has a High Degree of Autonomy. MOMEPE’s flat, autonomous organization gave the “man on the ground” the widest latitude in making operational decisions. The MOMEPE staff developed and approved their own plans on the spot. This quick response time gave MOMEPE the initiative.

MOMEPE’s autonomy was born of necessity. MOMEPE was an ad-hoc organization only formed when the Peru Ecuador crisis broke out. There was no standing bureaucratic structure in place. MOMEPE had no affiliation with United Nations or the Organization of American States. Their charter came from the Rio Protocol and the Itamaraty Accord. The forty observers and the 82-man support element in Patuca, Ecuador was the sum total of their force structure. It was a very flat organization with a simple command structure.

MOMEPE received political direction from a committee of “High Functionaries.” Initially this committee was formed by the Ambassadors of Argentina, Chile and the US in Brasilia and a representative of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry. Subsequently this mission was assumed by a committee of special envoys from each of the Guarantor Foreign Ministries and the US State Department.⁴⁹ This group worked the diplomatic

⁴⁹ Weidner, “Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley”: p.7.

effort, focusing on finding a long range political solution to the border dispute. MOMEP kept the diplomats fully informed of developments in the conflictive zone. The diplomats entrusted MOMEP with the military aspects of the peacekeeping effort and did not interfere with their operations.

The MOMEP Colonels call back to their home countries, but seldom, if ever, are their decisions second-guessed. There is no circumvention of the chain of command, no countermanding of authority, and no attempt to control the mission from afar.

The Argentines and Chileans, in particular, have complete freedom of action, their Armed Forces place great faith in their professional judgment. The US and Brazilian partners have that same faith, but have more stringent reporting procedures. Brazil, in the leadership role, maintains constant communication with their Foreign Ministry in Itamaraty. The US Contingent keeps continuous communications with SOUTHCOM, sending daily SITREPs. In the end, the Brazilian General and his four MOMEP Colonels operate with extreme efficiency despite the fact that four nations are involved.

In contrast to their Guarantor counterparts, the US Contingent receives a steady stream of visitors and VIPs. These visits have enhanced and have not undermined the mission effectiveness. US visitors can fly from Howard Air Force Base, Panama on regularly scheduled C27 resupply flights to Patuca, Ecuador. The CINCSOUTHCOM, the CINCSOCOM, the Commanding General of United States Army South (USARSO) and Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) all have made command visits to the MOMEP camp. These high level US visits did not usurp, but reinforced the position of the Brazilian Coordinator General. The recurring question asked to the Brazilian General was, "Are you satisfied with the support that we are giving you?" There was never an attempt to interfere in internal MOMEP operations. The US visits have also sent positive signals to the belligerents, assuring them that their border issue has not been forgotten.

MOMEPE and the Diplomatic Effort: A Close Association.

A close association between the supervisory and the conflict resolution functions could have negative side effects. States may find it difficult to regard the peacekeeping troops as neutral when they are aligned with the personnel that must make controversial decisions and proposals in the search for an acceptable compromise. The disputing parties may question the neutrality of the peacekeeping troops.

Paul F. Diehl
International Peacekeeping⁵⁰

The Ecuador-Peru clash showed that multilateral cooperation on sensitive security issues is possible. Close coordination between civilian and military officials in guarantor nations, among guarantors, and between guarantors and both parties was critical.

Ambassador Luigi R. Einaudi
US Special Envoy to Peru-Ecuador Negotiations⁵¹

Peacekeeping conventional wisdom recommends military and diplomatic functions be kept separate. The goal is to protect the military peacekeepers neutrality in the event that "controversial decisions and proposals" are made. MOMEPE broke that mold. They had close coordination with the diplomatic effort and in doing so they made it less likely that "controversial decisions and proposals" were made in the first place.

Satisfactory solutions to difficult problems were more forthcoming when the Guarantor Diplomats took advantage of the professional insights gained by the MOMEPE Staff.⁵² MOMEPE helped "bridge the gap" between the diplomats political sensing and reality on the ground. Living the border situation 7 days a week, 24 hours a day, the MOMEPE Staff had unequalled knowledge of the two former belligerents and their attitudes. In contrast, the Guarantor diplomats all had competing foreign affairs responsibilities in addition to the Peru-Ecuador conflict.

When the MOMEPE Staff was called to Lima to Quito for high level diplomatic meetings, they updated their respective embassies and defense attaches on the border situation. This ensured that embassy actions and statements on the border dispute were synchronized with Guarantor activity.

⁵⁰ Diehl, p.101.

⁵¹ Einaudi, "Security and Democracy in the Region," p.72.

⁵² The term "MOMEPE Staff" refers to the Brazilian Coordinator General, his Chief of Staff (Brazilian Colonel) and the four MOMEPE Colonels. This element would travel to the diplomatic meetings on request. They would leave command of routine MOMEPE observer operations in Patuca to the next senior officer. The MOMEPE staff traveled with a SATCOM radio package to maintain contact with the MOMEPE Operations Centers in Patuca and Bagua.

MOMEPE: Responsive and Accessible.

MOMEPE's selection of Patuca, Ecuador for their main base camp, and Bagua, Peru, as the site of their LNO team greatly enhanced MOMEPE's accessibility to the belligerent forces. There were several other suitable locations, less remote, with better infrastructure and amenities, but MOMEPE sacrificed comfort for accessibility. Patuca and Bagua were the sites of the respective belligerent theater commander headquarters--the commanders with operational jurisdiction over the conflictive zone. This basing arrangement gave belligerent theater commanders immediate access to MOMEPE representatives around the clock. The MOMEPE Staff was never more than a few minutes walk away. Likewise, MOMEPE's job was made easier. Face to face meetings were superior to radio or telephone conversations when resolving cease-fire violations

MOMEPE Staff is Housed Together.

The four MOMEPE Contingent Commanders were billeted together, with the Brazilian Coordinator General one building over. This enhanced the effectiveness of the mission. When emergency situations arose, the staff could be assembled instantly. Even after the day's official deliberation were concluded, the Staff would always be "in session." Many "eureka" concepts were put forth at all hours of the night. The MOMEPE Staff developed strong professional and personal relationships. They could dispense with cumbersome etiquette and cut to the heart of the matter.

MOMEPE Staff is Highly Mobile.

The MOMEPE Staff could move on a dime "to the sound of the guns." They lived out of their rucksacks. They were often called on short notice to Brasilia, Miami, Quito, Lima, Bagua, Patuca or the DMZ for diplomatic or military meetings. The C27 capable airstrip at their doorstep enhanced this mobility. The MOMEPE Staff always deployed with a communications package (SATCOM and HF backup) to stay abreast of observer operations in the DMZ and border. MOMEPE's mobility allowed them to retain the initiative. MOMEPE never let the belligerents or outside forces control the flow of events.

Achieving Consensus Within MOMEPE.

MOMEPE Staff had consensus planning. There was never a Chilean planning session or an Argentine planning session, only MOMEPE planning sessions. All countries were encouraged to voice their opinion. There was often heated debate, but each man was heard out. There was no competing national political agendas at work. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US had similar perspectives on how the mission should be conducted.⁵³

⁵³ See Weidner, "Peacekeeping in the Upper Cenepa Valley," pp.13-14. In April 1995, there was a significant difference of opinion among the MOMEPE Staff on the peacekeeping mandate. The belligerent forces wanted MOMEPE to supervise their demobilization ceremonies 3-13 May 1995. These ceremonies were to take place nationwide at several locations. Some Guarantors felt that MOMEPE's responsibility only extended to the conflictive zone in the Upper Cenepa. But other Guarantors felt that an exception should be made in this case, in the interests of accelerating the peace process. Following a lengthy debate, the MOMEPE Staff participated in the ceremonies. Afterwards all agreed that it was the right decision.

Developing Internal Cohesion Within MOMEF

Several measures were taken to build and accelerate cohesion among MOMEF's forty observers. MOMEF Observer missions were always multinational, with at least two of the four countries represented. Efforts were made to evenly distribute the MOMEF responsibilities to make each guarantor feel that they were making a meaningful contribution to the peacekeeping effort. Observers lived in two and three man rooms, never billeted with an observer from the same country. All Observers ate in the same mess facility. MOMEF organized a variety of sports, social, and national holiday commemorations to build rapport among the observer group. The end result was a unified organization, and an absence of the tendency to break down into national cliques.

Conclusions

MOMEF demonstrated that regional peacekeeping forces have distinct advantages. MOMEF's homogeneity, situational awareness, and language capability allowed them to relate to the crisis in a more efficient and informed manner. MOMEF's awareness of cultural sensitivities gave them the tools to integrate the former belligerents into the peacekeeping force. MOMEF also demonstrated that US leadership is not always required or desirable. MOMEF showed that a flat, highly autonomous, readily accessible organization, is a responsive organization. Finally MOMEF demonstrates that a close working relationship between the diplomatic and military efforts enhances the overall effort.

SECTION III

US JOINT TASK FORCE SAFE BORDER: Supporting MOMEF.

Don't send a truck and a trailer to pick up groceries from the corner store when a bicycle will do.

Dent Ocaya-Lakidi
Senior Fellow, Africa Program, International Peace Academy⁵⁴

Effective command relationships result in effective military operations

DR David S. Alberts and DR Richard Hayes
Command Arrangements for Peace Operations⁵⁵

In this section I will discuss how JTF Safer Border provided MOMEF with an immediate support base, alleviating much of the disorganization and inefficiency normally expected in the start-up of a multinational mission.⁵⁶ I will discuss the rationale behind the US decision to participate in MOMEF and deploy JTF Safe Border. I will discuss the ways in which JTF Safe Border kept personnel and resources commitments down through such initiatives as host nation support and off-site aviation maintenance.

JTF Safe Border was the 82-man US support element based in Patuca, Ecuador that provided aviation, communications, operations and logistical support for MOMEF. JTF Safe Border was the launch pad for MOMEF observer operations. The JTF was built around a standing unit headquarters, the 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and an aviation element from the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, Howard Air Force Base, Panama.

The US Decision to Participate.

Terrible, tragic things happen in the world all the time. That doesn't mean that the US can, or should, act to prevent them. Unless compelling national interests are at stake, non-intervention is the wiser and better policy.

Christopher Layne
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ocaya-Lakidi, p.153.

⁵⁵ Alberts and Hayes, p.27.

⁵⁶ Diehl, p.115

⁵⁷ Layne, pp.87-88.

Latin America is ranked low by Washington when it comes to economic, political, and international security priorities. The low prominence of the Americas reflects that there are no vital national security interests that threatens our survival... the US is tempted to ignore the area.

GEN Barry McCaffrey
Commander-in-Chief, SOUTHCOM⁵⁸

We have an unlimited number of opportunities to act around the world, but we do not have unlimited resources, nor do we have unlimited responsibilities. We are not a charity or a volunteer fire department.

Madeline Albright
Senate Confirmation Hearing
8 January 1997.

US policy makers did not fully embrace the invitation to participate in MOMEF in February 1995. Nay-sayers remembered painful experiences in Mogadishu (October 93) and Iraq (April 94) and on the horizon saw possible long-term commitments in Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda. They questioned whether the US should become involved in another peacekeeping mission where there was no direct threat or vital interest at stake. Policy makers knew once US forces were committed, it would be hard to withdraw them for both political and operational reasons⁵⁹ and "the act of intervention makes the peace operators responsible for the outcome."⁶⁰

Those calling for MOMEF participation contended key issues were at stake. The US "credit worthiness" as a signator of the Rio Protocol was being questioned.⁶¹ Peru and Ecuador were major US partners in the Andean Ridge Counternarcotics Program. The non-proliferation of high tech weaponry, and the pursuit of democracy and free trade in Latin America were endangered by the conflict.⁶²

Nay-sayers wanted a solid cease-fire in place as a pre-condition for US observer participation. Belligerent units, still intermingled on the jungle battlefield, were continuing to exchange gunfire.⁶³ Those pushing for US participation said the cease-fire would never hold unless the peacekeepers deployed to the Cenepa and separated the forces.

⁵⁸ McCaffrey, p.44.

⁵⁹ Rader, Peace Support Operations and the US Military, p.57.

⁶⁰ Alberts and Hayes, p.22

⁶¹ "Ecuador Criticizes US 'Idleness' During Conflict," Hamburg DPA, in FBIS Latin America, 27 February 1995, p.25 and "Argentina--Foreign Minister Di Tella on Peru-Ecuador Conflict Impact," Madrid EFE, in FBIS Latin America, 22 February 1995, p.43

⁶² Marcella

⁶³ "Observers May Be Withdrawn Unless Cease-fire Prevails." Santiago, La Segunda, in FBIS Latin America, 23 February 1995, p.1 and "Threaten to Suspend Observers Mission," Madrid EFE, in FBIS Latin America, 24 February 1995, p.1 and "COL. Grijalva: Skirmishes Not To Affect Cease-Fire," Paris AFP, in FBIS Latin America, 21 February 1995, p.48

In the end "doing nothing is usually not an option for the United States."⁶⁴ Besides, the MOMEPE proposal met many of the criteria outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).⁶⁵ The mission was small, of short duration, had a high level of consent from belligerent forces, a cease-fire was in place, it was a multinational effort, and the belligerents would fund it. The cumulative weight of these factors persuaded US policy makers to join Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in MOMEPE.

In addition to the ten US observers called for by the Guarantors, GEN McCaffrey requested permission to provide a US support element to MOMEPE, to be named JTF Safe Border.

Why JTF Safe Border?

MOMEPE originally planned to go forward without a JTF Safe Border support element. Peru and Ecuador were ready to provide all food, lodging, transportation, and communications for the 40 man MOMEPE observer force. Article One of the Declaration of Itamaraty states, "The parties (Ecuador and Peru) pledge to supply the support and facilities that the observers may find necessary to carry out their mission." Under the belligerent support plan, MOMEPE observers would bring personal baggage only. The observers would satellite off the existing infrastructure on each side of the border. They would fly in belligerent helicopters and communicate over belligerent tactical radios. This plan was economical--but not effective.

GEN McCaffrey felt MOMEPE would fail without a stand-alone support base of their own. MOMEPE's situational awareness would be held hostage to the whims of the belligerent communications, aviation, and logistics systems. A stand-alone MOMEPE support base would give the peacekeepers freedom of movement, agility, responsiveness, and secure communications. A stand alone MOMEPE would have an identity and more importantly, credibility.

Safety was also on GEN McCaffrey's mind. He considered it high risk for MOMEPE observers to fly in belligerent aircraft so soon after the conflict with a still tenuous cease-fire in effect. He also questioned the air-worthiness of belligerent helicopters, following two months of hard flying in the combat zone. The US UH-60A Blackhawks, with their superb maintenance and pilots, gave MOMEPE a distinctive signature and the safest flying platform in the world. JTF Safe Border's satellite communications systems, weather team, and medical support personnel were added measures of safety. GEN McCaffrey knew US Government support for the MOMEPE mission would unravel with even a single US casualty. The safety issue persuaded US policy planners to approve GEN McCaffrey's JTF Safe Border support plan. However, JTF Safe Border would be restricted to a maximum of 82 US personnel, SOUTHCOM's initial estimate of the force requirement.

⁶⁴ Luck, p.72.

⁶⁵ The Clinton Administration's policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. The directive addresses six major issues of reform and improvement.

Selection of US Forces to Participate.

GEN McCaffrey became a “product champion” of Special Forces while serving as CINCSOUTHCOM. The Special Forces detachments he observed on counterdrug and foreign internal defense training missions throughout Latin America had made a positive impression. He knew that Special Forces soldiers had the maturity, familiarity with Latin American militaries, language capability, high readiness posture, and the ability to function in ill-defined situations. More importantly, he knew Special Forces could operate in remote and austere areas like the Upper Cenepa with minimum support and take maximum advantage of local resources. This last characteristic would help keep the mission below the 82-man limit.

By organizing JTF Safe Border around the standing headquarters of the 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces Group, it would be built on a foundation of personnel comfortable working together, with set operational procedures in place. This unit cohesion would be especially helpful during the start-up phase of the ad-hoc MOMEF mission, as observers from four countries scrambled to organize and adjust to their new surroundings.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, would provide operations, intelligence/information, communications, medical, and logistics coordination for the operation. The Spanish speaking US staff officers in the Special Forces Battalion Headquarters could interface directly with Guarantor and Belligerent forces and handle MOMEF correspondence and communications. The SF officers had experience working with coalition staffs and would promote multinational MOMEF participation in JTF Safe Border activities, with the goal of making the mission a combined effort. Finally, these versatile Special Forces soldiers gave the US Contingent Commander an additional resource, beyond the ten US observers, to task organize for emerging peacekeeping requirements in the conflictive zone.

The logical choice for helicopter support was the Panama-based 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment. The 1-228th could dedicate a battalion’s worth of equipment and personnel to keep JTF Safe Border’s four UH-60 Blackhawks operational. Since the Ecuadoran camp was only a four hour flight from Panama, the 1-228th would forward deploy a small maintenance contact team, keeping the rest of the Battalion maintenance support assets on-call in Panama. This arrangement allowed the 1-228th to continue to support routine operations throughout Latin America. It also helped to maintain JTF Safe Border’s personnel head count below the 82-man ceiling.

Because JTF Safe Border’s lead element was Special Forces, the Executive Agent was BG Kenneth Bowra, the Commanding General, Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH), Panama. Nine months later, after the mission was fully in-place, United States Army South, Panama was named Executive Agent.

Waiting to Deploy.

As the debate on US participation continued, BG Bowra, COMSOCSOUTH, tried to forward stage all JTF Safe Border elements in Panama, for full mission rehearsals. His goal was to avoid the potential confusion of the different JTF Safe Border elements meeting for the first time in the conflictive zone.

The 3rd Battalion, 7th SFG(A) did not receive Joint Chiefs of Staff approval to move forward to Panama until 3 March 1997. This delay deprived the JTF of rehearsal time, but did give them an opportunity to bring the entire Task Force together for consolidated briefings on topics such as the Peru-Ecuador conflict, the Rio Protocol and the Declaration of Itamaraty, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Communications, and Public Affairs (PAO) guidance. All personnel were screened for medical and legal requirements. Manifests and aircraft loads were prepared.

The delay in Joint Chiefs of Staff approval also affected COL Weidner and the US Observer Contingent. While other Guarantor Observer Contingents rallied in Brasilia for mission preparation, the US Observer Contingent was held up in Panama pending JCS approval. By the time COL Weidner arrived in Brasilia, the MOMEF planning process was underway. COL Weidner had missed the opportunity to "get in on the ground floor" and as a "late arrival" had to be sensitive to Guarantor sentiments when critiquing their initial plans.

United States Military Group-Ecuador (Site Survey by Proxy).

Mission success depends on a good site survey. The United States Military Group (USMILGP) Ecuador played a key role in helping JTF Safe Border conduct the survey.

JTF Safe Border wanted to be operational in the conflictive zone prior to the 11 March 95 arrival of the MOMEF observers from Brasilia. To do this, the JTF Safe Border Advance Party would need one week lead time for site surveys and preparations. In the end, the delay in the JCS approval process would give JTF Safe Border only a 48 hour head start.

However, the United States Military Group Commander, COL Steve Hightower and Army Section Chief, LTC Gilberto Perez grasped JTF Safe Border's dilemma. On 3 March 1995 they left Quito, Ecuador, traveling 350 kilometers to the conflictive zone to gather site survey information on JTF Safe Border's behalf. Both were former members of 7th Special Forces Group and knew JTF Safe Border's requirements. Fortuitously, LTC Perez had authored the "7th Special Forces Group Site Survey Planning Guide."

The USMILGP visit to the conflictive zone was key to JTF Safe Border's success for three reasons.

First, the USMILGP study confirmed that Patuca, Ecuador (70 kms north of conflictive zone) was the best site. SOUTHCOM planners originally believed Gualaquiza, Ecuador, 18 kms from conflictive zone with C130 capable airstrip, had the best potential. However, COL Hightower's on-site discussions with Ecuadoran Aviation revealed that helicopter pilots leaving Gualaquiza normally flew an 80 km circuitous route around the consistently cloud covered Condor Mountain Range to access the conflictive zone. In contrast, Patuca's air corridor, down the Coangos River, was more reliable--open most days from 1100-1600 hrs. COL Hightower also confirmed GEN Moncayo and Ecuadoran Theater Army Headquarters would remain in Patuca until demobilization. This would give MOMEF Staff direct access to the key Ecuadoran Military decision maker. Finally, USMILGP's calculations revealed Patuca's airstrip could handle SOUTHCOM's C27 aircraft. This airstrip would greatly facilitate deployment and sustainment.

The second advantage of the USMILGP survey was that it provided JTF Safe Border logistics planners in Panama with details on the Patuca support infrastructure. This allowed them to reconfigure and streamline the air movement plan. Planners canceled nearly five C130 aircraft loads due to the USMILGP report on the capabilities of the Patuca water purification plant, operation center buildings, aviation fuel point, and material handling equipment.

Finally, the USMILGP alerted both the US Embassy and Ecuadoran national and local authorities to the size and scope of the JTF Safe Border mission. Since JTF Safe Border was not part of the original MOMEPE concept, host nation authorities were unaware of the details. Even though JTF Safe Border was deploying into a benign, permissive environment, lack of cooperation from Ecuadoran air control, customs, and military authorities would seriously jeopardize the deployment. USMILGP's briefing gave the Ecuadoran authorities time to prepare for the JTF's arrival.

Mobilizing Host Nation Support.

JTF Safe Border lead elements arrived in Patuca, Ecuador on 9 March 1995, only 48 hours ahead of the MOMEPE observers. In the race against the clock, JTF Safe Border conducted an immediate surge recruitment of host nation laborers and transport to accelerate the establishment of the Task Force.

Rather than comb the streets on their own, the JTF Safe Border advance team coordinated through the 21st Jungle Brigade, Patuca, Ecuador for assistance. The Ecuadoran Supply Officer had active contacts within the local population, and access to sources for military and civilian line haul. He also provided advice on the fair pay scale.

Men and transport were quickly mobilized. The Supply Officer enhanced his reputation with the locals, giving him further incentive to assist JTF Safe Border in the future.

The MOMEPE Observers arrived in Patuca from Brasilia on 11 March 1995--the same day as the first aircraft of JTF Safe Border's Main Body. JTF Safe Border managed to meet their goal of being operational upon MOMEPE's arrival. It would take three more days for all JTF Safe Border personnel to fully close in on Patuca. However, the front loading of key operations and signal center equipment, and the surge in host nation support allowed JTF Safe Border to meet the compressed time schedule.

JTF Safe Border in Action.

JTF Safe Border's Interface with MOMEPE.

JTF Safe Border, composed entirely of US personnel, was a full member of the MOMEPE team. They made every effort to promote Guarantor participation in the JTF Safe Border operational activities.

The MOMEPE Colonels, consumed by planning the operational and strategic direction of the peacekeeping mission, relied on the JTF Safe Border staff to track and execute the day to day details of routine observer operations. The Colonels, in addition to their roles as Contingent Commanders, each had a designated MOMEPE staff function. The Brazilian Colonel was assigned J1 Personnel responsibilities, the Chilean Colonel--J2 Information Officer, the Argentine Colonel as J3 Operations, and the US Colonel, J4 Logistics. The Brazilians had an additional Colonel assigned to MOMEPE performing

duties as Chief of Staff. The MOMEF Colonels provided staff oversight of their designated functional areas within JTF Safe Border, checking daily to ensure that operations were synchronized with MOMEF's "vision."

The JTF Safe Border Staff provided nightly updates to the US Contingent Commander. The US Commander, in turn, kept the Safe Border staff apprised of MOMEF discussions and diplomatic developments. This information exchange gave JTF Safe Border the confidence to operate with wide latitude throughout the day.

The J3, JTF Safe Border worked closely with MOMEF's Chief of Observer Operations, a Chilean Lieutenant Colonel. The Chilean LTC set up his office in the JTF Safe Border operations center, coordinating and cross-checking his operations with the J3, JTF Safe Border.

JTF Safe Border and the Special Forces Forward Operations Base.

JTF Safe Border used the Special Forces Battalion Forward Operations Base (FOB) concept as a model for their operations. The FOB is designed to prepare, launch, recover, and command and control Special Forces teams deployed over wide geographical areas. The FOB configuration was an ideal launch pad and command center for controlling MOMEF observer teams, operating in remote locations in as many as four countries simultaneously.

JTF Safe Border Command Group.

The Command Group had both Special Forces and Aviation representation. Since the 82-man JTF had equal numbers of Special Forces and Aviation personnel, this arrangement enhanced cohesion and unity of effort.

While Special Forces focused on the military to military relationships with MOMEF and the belligerents, the Aviation concentrated on providing safe and effective helicopter support. The Command Group makeup ensured both SF and Aviation concerns were equally considered.

The Commander of JTF Safe Border during MOMEF I was the Commander, 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces. His Executive Officer was the Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment. In subsequent rotations, Aviation Officers acted as the JTF Safe Border Commander with a Special Forces Officer as JTF Executive Officer. The JTF Sergeant Major has always been a Special Forces Sergeant Major.

Operations Center. JTF Safe Border's Operation Center had J2 and J3 cells.

J2 Information Officer.

In peace operations, belligerent parties may perceive intelligence gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence activities may therefore destroy the trust that the parties should have in the peace operations force.

FM 100-23⁶⁶

⁶⁶ FM 100-23, p.47.

A Military Intelligence Captain and two NCOs worked in the "Information" Section. MOMEP opted for the term "Information" Section to avoid belligerent perceptions that the J2 was a combat intelligence activity gathering information on "hostile" forces.

Information efforts focused on the border area in and around the Demilitarized Zone and Zone Alpha. The objective was to verify compliance with the Itamaraty and DMZ Accords. MOMEP aerial patrols and observer operations confirmed that troop strengths and dispositions were in accordance with the agreements. The J2 analyzed the information to ascertain former belligerent intent and courses of actions that might violate the peace.

The J2, Safe Border was the single MOMEP-wide Information Center. All four observer contingents funneled information into the J2, JTF Safe Border. The J2 briefed Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean and US observers prior to departure, and debriefed them upon return.

The J2 maintained data and posted key information on the map. He posted alleged cease-fire violations with date and time. The J2 also posted known locations of landmines on maps and photo-mosaics of observer outposts. On demand, he would provide the MOMEP Staff and observers with map coverage, imagery and overlays

Prior to the integration of Peruvians and Ecuadorans into MOMEP, the J2 was careful to safeguard and protect troop disposition and order of battle information. The former belligerents became more cooperative in answering MOMEP requests for information when they observed MOMEP exercising great care in protecting this data. There was reluctance on the part of the belligerents, particularly following the cease-fire, to provide troop locations to MOMEP for fear that former adversaries might gain access and use the information to their disadvantage.

The J2 also restricted belligerent access to the MOMEP planning room, where the MOMEP Staff debated all possible courses of action for future observer operations. The more radical proposals displayed on planning boards could have aggravated belligerents, causing undue alarm and animosity towards the peacekeepers.

RELGOG (Releasable to the Guarantor Observer Group).

The J2, Safe Border received messages, databases, and imagery from the J2, SOUTHCOM. In the initial days of MOMEP, the Guarantor contingents were denied access to this information because it was classified SECRET NOFORN (Not Releasable to Foreigners).

Observers from Argentina, Brazil and Chile felt the US was not a good team player in holding back key information from MOMEP partners. SOUTHCOM, recognizing the threat to MOMEP harmony, obtained permission to classify most information relevant to the border region as SECRET RELGOG (Releasable to the Guarantor Observer Group). This timely action had an immediate positive effect on the collegiality of the mission.

Once observer operations got underway, however, MOMEP quickly recognized that their own observer-generated information was more detailed and timely than the SECRET-RELGOG information produced by SOUTHCOM. The MOMEP photo imagery taken with video and digital photo cameras during helicopter air patrols met their

needs far more than high altitude satellite imagery. The classification problem soon became a non-issue.

HUMINT vs. TECHINT.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) was the best method of information collection. The MOMEF information effort centered on HUMINT derived from the observers. The first-hand observations of the MOMEF personnel on routine aerial patrols or observer operations produced the most worthwhile information..

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) means were of limited value in the Cenepa. The thick jungle canopy negated the effectiveness of Airborne Reconnaissance platforms. Ground sensors were unreliable due to heavy rains, mudslides, rapid jungle growth, and animal traffic.

Some MOMEF officers suggested employing technical means for purely psychological effect. They argued that overflights and ground sensors could act as a confidence building measure and a deterrent to potential DMZ violators. To date, MOMEF has not adopted this proposal.

J3-Operations.

The J3 Section ran the MOMEF Current Operations Section. They synchronized all observer and logistics activities, making maximum use of resources, personnel and airframes. The J3 maintained an operations tracking board so that all MOMEF observers could, at a glance, get an update on ongoing and projected operations.

The Signal Center.

The breakthrough comes not from the technology itself but from the way in which it is used.

David Shukman
Tomorrow's War⁶⁷

Communications were key to MOMEF's success. JTF Safe Border's superior communications gave MOMEF an impact much greater than the sum of its parts. The SATCOM radios, with HF backup, gave the peacekeeping force continuous, secure, reliable, and redundant communications. MOMEF was able to maintain exceptional situational awareness and could openly discuss controversial and sensitive information without fear of compromise.

A Signal Corps officer and team of communications soldiers ran the JTF Safe Border Signal Center. They were responsible for operating Base Station Communications, providing radio operators for MOMEF observer teams, operating the Multichannel Tactical Satellite Communications, maintaining the Automated Data Processing (ADP) support, providing electrical expertise in the camp, and ensuring that generators were in working order.

The Signal Center sent a radio operator with a communications package on all MOMEF missions.⁶⁸ This included observer missions into the DMZ and MOMEF Staff

⁶⁷ David Shukman, Tomorrow's War, p.6.

trips to high level diplomatic meetings. The MOMEPE Staff could control simultaneously observer actions in the DMZ, at demobilization ceremonies, during Superior Consultative Committee Meetings, and in Quito, Lima, Panama, or Brasilia.

This wide coverage gave the small MOMEPE force an omnipresence. This acted as a confidence builder for the belligerents when they recognized that MOMEPE, through their reliable and extensive communications network, could quickly resolve cease-fire allegations and border questions.

MOMEPE's foreign nationals were denied free access into the Radio Room. Security restrictions prohibited foreign nationals from handling the communications encryption devices. Also, SOUTHCOM routinely sent JTF Safe Border classified, US-only, message traffic over the radio.

When MOMEPE's foreign nationals wished to send information over the radio to deployed elements, however, the US radio operators secured the classified information and material, allowing the MOMEPE observer to pass his traffic.

Having US radio operators on the ground meant having a US representative present for all MOMEPE activities. A MOMEPE observer team composition might not include a US observer, but it would always include a US radio operator. The mature, Spanish-speaking Special Forces radio operators provided accurate reporting and analysis, always keeping the US Contingent fully informed.

First Class or Not At All.

COL Weidner recognized the importance of communications for the MOMEPE mission and he took steps to reinforce the basecamp power network. The Ecuadoran wiring system could not support the heavy load of JTF Safe Border radios, computers, and copy machines. This remote area also experienced routine power outages. SOUTHCOM sent a US Navy SEABEE to rewire the JTF Safe Border buildings. The Signal Section installed several generators as multiple backups to the commercial power system.

COL Weidner also brought the Multichannel (AN/TSC-93) Ground Mobile Force (GMF) Tactical terminal to Patuca, Ecuador. This system was linked with a DSN gateway in Panama and placed six telephone lines into the MOMEPE headquarters. These telephones allowed JTF Safe Border personnel to talk directly to Panama and Ft Bragg, North Carolina. This system did not directly assist other Guarantor Nations in MOMEPE, but it was indispensable for US JTF Safe Border in coordinating logistics, maintenance requests, and personnel rotations. This system was far superior to the unsteady performance of JTF Safe Border's International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSATs) telephones.

⁶⁸ The radio operators were Spanish speaking Special Forces NCOs. These Special Forces NCOs came from all the Special Forces Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Many had a primary specialty of Engineer, Medic, or Weapons but all had received cross-training in Communications. The MOMEPE observer teams rotated every three days from the outposts, but the Special Forces radio operators normally rotated every six days. This provided mission continuity, and earned them respect from the MOMEPE observers, impressed with their hard work and tougher schedule.

Local Telephones

The Ecuadoran 21st Jungle Brigade in Patuca, Ecuador donated two of their four outside commercial telephone lines to the MOMEPE mission. MOMEPE used these non-secure lines heavily. Argentina, Chile, and Brazil used the Ecuadoran lines to contact their home countries for official business and for morale and welfare calls. The US personnel utilized the lines to contact the US Country Teams in Lima and Quito and commercial contractors in Quito.

Brazil also had two INMARSATs for dedicated communications with their Foreign Ministry in Brasilia.

The JTF Safe Border Support Center.

On larger peacekeeping operations only a fraction are used in combat operations, as support units provide the mundane but necessary tasks of cooking and washing clothes, drastically increases the numbers of troops in the war zone. Noncombat units provide little in mission effectiveness but are costly and provide attractive targets for the enemy. Additionally, deploying the extra troops takes valuable time and equipment.

Pat Cooper
Army Times⁶⁹

The JTF Safe Border Support Center was a lean organization. The J1, J4, Medical Section, Internal Security, Mess Section and Air Force Crash Rescue Team constituted the entire Support Center. They provided the personnel and administrative support, logistical support, health care, internal security, vehicle and generator maintenance, mess hall, and Air Force Crash Rescue coverage. Most of the Support Center soldiers did double-duty performing peacekeeping tasks.

J4 Logistics.

There was no displaced person or human disaster that diverted or placed burdens on the MOMEPE logistics system. As in most traditional peacekeeping operations, logistics requirements were low. The biggest logistic requirement was keeping the helicopters flying.

Creating MOMEPE Property.

There are no "peacekeeping support packages" for US units to draw from when assigned a peacekeeping mission. For this reason, MOMEPE's peacekeeping equipment was the unit equipment of the 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces Group and the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment.

JTF Safe Border's ongoing goal is to create stand alone MOMEPE equipment. This serves three purposes. First, it frees-up the US combat unit equipment for the next

⁶⁹ Pat Cooper, "Communications: Lifeblood of Peacekeeping," Army Times, 15 July 1996, p.32.

contingency. Second, it avoids creating a vacuum should the US pull out of the mission. Third, it makes it easier for the US to pull out, since the peacekeeping mission will have become self-reliant.

JTF Safe Border replaced US unit equipment with contracted, fabricated, purchased, and warehoused equipment.

JTF Safe Border replaced all US unit computers, printers, and photocopiers with locally contracted equipment. This contract comes with on-site maintenance and repair.

Host nation carpenters built tables and desks, replacing US field desks.

The Cuban Displaced Persons Camp (Operation Safe Haven) and the US military drawdown in Panama gave JTF Safe Border two sources of equipment. When the 10,000 strong Cuban Displaced Person Camp closed in February 1995, thousands of cots and hundreds of GP Mediums became available for JTF Safe Border use. The US military drawdown in Panama made excess vehicles and generators available for Safe Border use. Although Safe Border could contract for all transportation requirements locally, they opted to retain the US 5-Ton Truck and three HUMMVs. These US military vehicles, with "MOMEPE" decal, create a credible and professional signature for the peacekeeping mission.

JTF Safe Border has been unable to "break away" three major items: helicopters, radios, and the USAF weather station. Brazil, however, is purchasing UH 60 Blackhawks in anticipation of replacing the 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment's helicopters for the MOMEPE support mission. Peruvian and Ecuadoran integration into MOMEPE negates the need for secure communications, but not the need for the reliable communications. The US satellite radios are superior to the belligerent HF radios, and provide a measure of safety to the observers operating in the remote outposts. SOUTHCOM also needs to continue to send secure traffic to the US Contingent in MOMEPE. The USAF weather station, key to safe fixed and rotary wing air operations, will also remain.

MOMEPE, Just Here for Awhile.

Peacekeeping operations are temporary. They should avoid giving the impression of permanence. A short-term peacekeeping presence instills a sense of urgency into former belligerents, motivating them to work hard toward reaching a diplomatic solution. If the parties sense peacekeepers are settling in for the long haul, they might relax and make half-hearted efforts to settle the dispute--resulting in a quagmire for the peacekeepers.

After more than two years, JTF Safe Border still retains the temporary "look." Soldiers remain billeted in tents. No money has been spent on permanent structures.

The JTF soldiers have improved their living conditions by installing wooden floors in the tents, constructing drainage ditches, upgrading the latrines, and emplacing volleyball and basketball courts..

The US Army South has also sent JTF Safe Border several amenities. A satellite dish television, weight training equipment, an ice machine, and mess hall equipment are some of the items that have arrived on the C27 flights.

Both JTF Safe Border and MOMEPE retain their temporary image and give the belligerents the impression that they could "pull up stakes" quickly if diplomatic efforts bog down.

The C27 and Dirt Airstrips (Force-Multiplier).

GEN Joulwan, CINCSOUTHCOM (1991-1993) brought the C27 to Panama to work the short dirt runways in the remote areas of Latin America. MOMEF validated the C27 concept. The C27 brought supplies and personnel from Panama into Patuca's C27-capable dirt-strip, twice weekly.

When the C27 lands, all available JTF Safe Border personnel break momentarily from daily routines to assist in the off-load. The C27 receives a follow-on mission, such as moving the MOMEF Staff to a high level meeting, or back-hauling excess equipment to Panama.

The nearest C130 airstrip is in Macas, Ecuador, a four hour ride by truck. Servicing a C130 supply run in Macas would take vehicles and personnel out of the camp for an entire day. The C27 has saved wear and tear on the vehicles, but has also allowed the JTF Safe Border to operate well-within the 82 man ceiling.

Maintenance of the Camp.

Another force multiplier that keeps US numbers down, is the 15-man Ecuadoran civilian work crew. The J4 hired these men at slightly higher than local wages as an incentive. This crew performs repairs and maintenance on the camp, keeps the jungle at bay, and services the camp drainage system. This allows US personnel to focus on peacekeeping functions. This work crew also acts as MOMEF's "window" into the local area, providing useful advice on getting along in Patuca.

Medical Section.

During MOMEF I, a Flight Surgeon, Physicians Assistant, a Senior Special Forces Medic, and an aeromedical NCO constituted the JTF Safe Border medical section. They established a standard Special Forces Battalion Aid Station. This medical capability, though excessive for the size of the deployment, was prudent under the circumstances. The remoteness of the region, and the far-reaching consequences of a US casualty, convinced planners to provide the full Battalion medical section complement.

The medical section's major contribution has been their aggressive preventive medicine program. The medical section screens the camp daily for health hazards. They regularly inspect Patuca's two local restaurants, patronized by off-duty MOMEF personnel. The Medical Section verifies sanitation standards, fumigates, installs screening, and provides treated water to these eating establishments. The medical section also gives regular lectures to the camp members on malaria control, and jungle hazards. The end result has been near zero incidents of gastrointestinal illness or malaria, an impressive accomplishment considering the challenges inherent in the Amazon region.

The Aviation Detachment.

The Aviation element consists of four UH-60A Blackhawk Helicopters, twenty-three Army Aviation personnel and a two man Air Force Weather Team. They provide air movement, aerial resupply, zone reconnaissance, MEDEVAC support, and aviation maintenance.

The aviation element is the backbone of the MOMEF peacekeeping effort. The Helicopter is the only way in or out of the DMZ. There are no roads into the area. From the nearest road, it is a seven-day walk, down a jungle trail, into the DMZ. However, walking is not an option due to the estimated 6,000 mines remaining inside the DMZ.

The field of view for observers at outposts within the DMZ is limited due to the dense jungle growth. The helicopter aerial patrols give MOMEF their best method of tracking compliance with the DMZ accords. The helicopters allow MOMEF to properly supervise the DMZ.

Helicopter operations are conducted during daylight only, although crews maintain night vision goggle proficiency as part of their unit training program.

Weather

The two-man USAF weather team constantly reevaluates the effects of weather on observer operations. This has contributed to the Aviation element's perfect safety record.

The terrain and weather in the Cenepa are demanding. The high altitudes, thunderstorms, lack of aeronautical charts, navigational aids and alternate landing zones can make routine observer missions hazardous. Clouds and rain move in and out of the area quickly.

Observers in the DMZ now operate small weather stations at outposts on Coangos (6000 feet) and PV1. This supplemental data has resulted in even more successful weather decisions.

JTF Safe Border Transition Planning, Mission Hand-off.

JTF Safe Border's strength is its ability to transition from one personnel rotation to another. Changeovers are seamless and without degradation of performance.

JTF Safe Border personnel do six month tours. The relief in-place from one rotation to the next is incrementally phased over a 45-day period. Key personnel do one week overlaps with their replacements. This system ensures a pool of experienced personnel are always on hand. By the time the last group of a new rotation arrives in Patuca, the first group of that new rotation already has 45-days on the ground.

Because JTF Safe Border rotations are internal to 7th Special Forces Group and the 1-228th Aviation, they are greatly simplified. Hand-offs occur between elements of the same command, accustomed to working with each other. Both the 7th Special Forces and the 1-228th Aviation have accumulated many former Safe Border members at their home stations who help prepare the new rotation for deployment into Patuca.

Conclusions.

JTF Safe Border provided MOMEF with the technology that allowed them to control observer teams over a widely dispersed area. JTF Safe Border gave the MOMEF Staff battlespace awareness, allowing them to make timely, and accurate assessments of the belligerent situation.

JTF Safe Border accomplished the mission with minimum amount of resources by making maximum use of host nation assets, by having C27-delivered logistics at their doorstep, and by having an off-site and on-call support base at US military installations in nearby Panama.

Finally, JTF Safe Border's Spanish speaking Special Forces soldiers had the versatility to conduct both JTF Safe Border support functions and peacekeeping duties as necessary. Their direct interface with MOMEF and the former belligerents, built bonds of trust, accelerated MOMEF cohesion, and facilitated the peace process.

SECTION IV
MOMEF FUNCTIONAL ISSUES
ACHIEVING IMPARTIALITY, ENFORCING COMPLIANCE, FORCE
PROTECTION, AVOIDING MISSION CREEP, AND FUNDING.

In this section I discuss how MOMEF met five important peacekeeping challenges: achieving impartiality, enforcing compliance, force protection, avoiding mission creep, and funding.

ACHIEVING IMPARTIALTY.

Among the most fundamental tenets of peacekeeping strategy is that the troops must be neutral

Paul F. Diehl
International Peacekeeping⁷⁰

The success of lightly armed peacekeeping missions depends on neutrality. Peacekeepers are not supposed to have enemies and their success rests on keeping it that way.

Stephen John Stedman
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping⁷¹

Impartiality must be demonstrated at all times, in all dealings, and under all circumstances whether operational, social, or administrative. All activities must be conducted without favor to either side of view.

FM 100-23⁷²

As regional actors, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the US came to the MOMEF mission with political baggage that could have made the belligerents question their impartiality. MOMEF, through attention to detail and finesse, maintained the perception of impartiality throughout the mission.

The Guarantor Baggage.

Neither belligerent objected to the participation any Guarantor country. However, some circumstances could have made belligerents question the sincerity, motivations, and impartiality of the observers.

Peru was sensitive towards Chile. Peru and Chile share a historically troubled border. Furthermore, Chile and Ecuador have a special relationship. Many Ecuadoran

⁷⁰ Diehl, p.64.

⁷¹ Stephen John Stedman, "UN Intervention in Civil Wars: Imperatives of Choice and Strategy," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, (New York: St. Martin's Press) 1995: p.41.

⁷² FM 100-23, p.18.

officers have attended Chilean military schools. A Chilean military industry upgraded Ecuadoran tanks and artillery in 1994⁷³ and the Peruvian press accused Chile of selling arms to the Ecuador during the January 1995 conflict.⁷⁴ The Argentine and German press accused Chile's General Pinochet of inciting the Ecuadoran military to initiate hostilities against Peru.⁷⁵ Shortly after MOMEPE's arrival, Ecuadoran Vice-President Dahik announced, "Chile has always been a friendly nation, a brother to Ecuador, and Ecuador has been a friend and a brother to Chile."⁷⁶

Argentina also raised eyebrows. Private Argentine arms dealers were accused of shipping 75 tons of Argentine weapons to Ecuador in February 1995.⁷⁷

Ecuador, on the other hand, feared that the Guarantor countries with large Peruvian investments would show bias towards Peru.⁷⁸

The Guarantors took steps to bring negative perceptions under control. They adopted a joint resolution, "not to grant any license to export arms or ammunition to any of the countries in the conflict."⁷⁹ Argentina sent a strong message when they indicted their former Defense Minister on charges of allowing the cover-up of the illegal 75 ton arms shipment to Ecuador.⁸⁰

MOMEPE minimized nationalist distinctions by establishing their own identity. All observer rulings were MOMEPE rulings. There was never a Chilean voice or an Argentine opinion, only a MOMEPE position. The belligerents would never sense that nationalist preferences or biases were working against them.

MOMEPE insured their external image projected a united front. All Observers wore identical white hats and shoulder brassard with small national flags. Observer helicopter and military vehicles had MOMEPE decals. MOMEPE signs were posted prominently on all their outposts and facilities.

In the first two months of MOMEPE, all observer teams were four man teams, one from each country. As operations became routine, observer teams dropped to two men, but never two of the same nationality.

⁷³ "Pinochet on Peru-Ecuador Conflict, Alleged Incitement," *Las Ultimas Noticias*, in FBIS Latin America, 10 February 1995, p.31.

⁷⁴ "Chilean Government Denies Weapons Sales to Ecuador," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 6 February 1995, p.37. The Ecuadoran President Duran Ballen said that the last arms purchase made from Chile was in September 1994, four months before hostilities in, "Says Chilean Arms Not Bought to Fight Peru," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 7 February 1995, p.20.

⁷⁵ "Pinochet on Peru-Ecuador Conflict, Alleged Incitement," *Las Ultimas Noticias*, in FBIS Latin America, 10 February 1995, p.31.

⁷⁶ "Dahik: Trade With Chile Unaffected by Conflict," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, reported in FBIS Latin America, 28 April 1995, p.19.

⁷⁷ Ecuadoran Defense Minister General Jose Gallardo admitted Ecuador bought arms during the conflict but did not disclose names of supplier countries in "Minister Admits Arms Purchase During Conflict," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 24 March 1995, p.36 and "Military: Ecuador Buying Arms From Bulgaria," *La Republica*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 March 1995, p.77.

⁷⁸ "Guarantors' Economic Interests, Impartiality Viewed," *EL Universo*, in FBIS Latin America, 27 March 1995, p.56.

⁷⁹ "Government Suspends Arms Sales to Peru, Ecuador," *Buenos Aires TELAM*, in FBIS Latin America, 14 February 1995, p.20.

⁸⁰ News Digest for November 1996, "Argentina."

In the initial phases of MOMEPE, observer assignments accommodated potential belligerent sensitivities. The first Chief of Observer Operations in Bagua, Peru, was an Argentine, LTC Mancione. The Chief of Observer Operations in Ecuador was a Chilean Officer. Once observer operations were underway, MOMEPE gained credibility, and nationality was no longer a consideration in making Chief of Observer Operations assignments.

SOUTHCOM selected US MILGP Commanders from Central America for US Contingent Commander, in part, because they had stand-off distance from the crisis.⁸¹ USMILGP Commanders in Ecuador and Peru, although a quick fix for the head Observer role, would have inherent difficulties. Their strong military to military relations with one of the former belligerents could lead to charges of "clientitis." In the event of an unpopular MOMEPE decision, future relations with their host nation would suffer, impacting on their ability to re-assume USMILGP duties.⁸²

A Single Support Base in Ecuador, Asymmetrical Symmetry.

Portraying symmetry, in action and deed, is key to preserving perceptions of neutrality. GEN McCaffrey violated the rule of symmetry and balance by choosing to provide only a single MOMEPE observer support base in Ecuador. By not establishing a mirrored support base in Peru, he risked alienating the Peruvians.

By ignoring symmetry, however, GEN McCaffrey cut the US troop, equipment, and helicopter commitment in half. This made the JTF Safe Border proposal more politically acceptable and more sustainable over the long haul. A single support base also enhanced unity of command and unity of effort.

MOMEPE planners chose Patuca, Ecuador for the single support base because it was the best location. Planners considered all possible sites on both sides of the border. Patuca was only 70 kilometers from the conflictive zone. The closest comparable Peruvian site was in Bagua, nearly 250 kilometers from the conflictive zone. During the war, Bagua's helicopter pilots sometimes struggled days to get through the clouds to the Upper Cenepa. MOMEPE did not want to face that same problem.

MOMEPE employed several methods to downplay the single support base imbalance. MOMEPE placed an eight man MOMEPE Liaison Element permanently in Bagua, Peru. A Guarantor Lieutenant Colonel headed the LNO team. The team included representatives from all four guarantor countries and a US run communications center. MOMEPE observers routinely rotated for two week periods into the MOMEPE LNO team. The observers widened their perspectives and gained an appreciation of both sides of the conflict.

The most successful technique used to offset lack of symmetry was the MOMEPE Staff's "home and away" travel plan. The MOMEPE Staff (Brazilian Coordinator General, and the four Colonel Contingent Commanders), although based in Patuca, split their time equally between Bagua and Patuca.

⁸¹ COL Weidner, MOMEPE I, was the USMILGP Commander Honduras. COL Fee, MOMEPE II, was USMILGP Commander, El Salvador.

⁸² SOUTHCOM also wanted to maintain USMILGPs in Peru and Ecuador fully manned. It was critical to keep all "windows" into the parties open in order to resolve the crisis.

While sharing the 21st Jungle Brigade cantonment area, MOMEP took pains to keep operations separate. The JTF Safe Border base and living area was on the extreme end of the camp, making it easy to see where MOMEP began and the 21st Jungle Brigade ended. GEN McCaffrey cautioned JTF Safe Border not to accept the Ecuadoran offers of office space inside the 21st Jungle Brigade Headquarters area because it could make it look like MOMEP was 'in bed' with the Ecuadoran Army.

MOMEP made sure their construction efforts did not contribute to the permanent improvement of the camp, in order to avoid the impression that Ecuador was benefiting materially from MOMEP's presence.

Peru never complained about symmetry. Both the Bagua MOMEP LNO team and the MOMEP Staff visits satisfied Peru that their side was being heard. Peru understood the operational challenge and economic costs of a second peacekeeping base. Peru knew that a smaller personnel and resource commitment made it more likely the Guarantors would continue to support MOMEP. Finally, a single support base was cheaper for Peru, who, together with Ecuador, was funding the peacekeeping mission.

Living in Ecuador.

Special relationships developed on the Ecuadoran side that were not mirrored in Peru. The MOMEP Staff put limits on these activities to avoid perceptions of bias.

There were regular soccer, volleyball and basketball competitions between the MOMEP, the Ecuadoran Army, and Ecuadoran civilians. It was primarily the US helicopter mechanics, generator repairmen and mess team participating in these events. Since these men have no direct peacekeeping functions, this lessened the significance of the bilateral events. The competitions built goodwill and gave the US support soldiers, locked down in the jungle camp, some exposure to the local environment--greatly enhancing morale.

MOMEP drew the line on military related competition and activities. Pistol competition and parachute jumps could expose MOMEP to accusations of helping former belligerents sharpen their combat skills.

MOMEP Assets and Ecuador

MOMEP denied Ecuadoran requests for MOMEP fixed wing, helicopter, and medical assistance. Because MOMEP was co-located with the Ecuadoran Army they were in a position to do "favors" for the Ecuadoran Army. However, since MOMEP could not do the same for Peru, it was MOMEP policy not to assist Ecuador. MOMEP reasoned that Ecuador would gain an unfair advantage over Peru, because Ecuador would theoretically reduce military expenditures hitchhiking on MOMEP transport.

Ecuadoran requests were frequent in the first weeks of the mission, but stopped completely once they understood MOMEP's position. The most common request was for helicopter rides into or out of the conflictive zone. MOMEP's UH-60A missions always had room for a few extra passengers. Ecuadoran soldiers, going on pass, often asked to be taken to Quito or Guayaquil on the USAF C27 flight.

Ecuadoran civilians habitually came to the MOMEP aid station for medical assistance. These civilians were escorted courteously to the Ecuadoran Army medical clinic on the other side of the compound. MOMEP wanted to reinforce, not supplant, the

host nation medical system. The Ecuadoran Army Clinic was fully staffed, capable, and well stocked.

MOMEF never turned down requests for assistance when soldiers or civilians were in danger of losing life or limb.

Once Peruvians and Ecuadorans were integrated into MOMEF, restrictions on flying former belligerents became less rigid.

Ecuadorans Decorate the MOMEF Observers.

The Ecuadoran Army decorated MOMEF observers with the Military Star of Ecuador. Ecuador presented this medal as a gesture of gratitude for MOMEF's contributions to the peace process. The MOMEF Staff counseled observers not to let the award presentation influence their ability to act in an unbiased manner. The Ecuadorans normally presented the medal near the end of the observer's tour, minimizing the effect, if any, on the observer's impartiality.

Details, Details, Details.

While still in Panama, JTF Safe Border Signal Center printed 200 copies of a bilingual Communications Electronics Operating Instruction booklet. Because MOMEF's activities were to be centered around the Condor Mountain Range, the Signal Officer selected the radio call sign "Condor" for all MOMEF observer elements. When JTF Safe Border arrived in Patuca they discovered the Ecuadoran 21st Jungle Brigade was called, "The Condor Brigade." The Signal Officer destroyed the CEOIs, and adopted an "impartial" call sign, "Vulcan."

The names of the Peruvian and Ecuadoran jungle base camps inside the DMZ have special significance to the belligerents. Base Sur and Tiwintza are two famous Ecuadoran bases. Base Norte is a Peruvian base. MOMEF does not refer to these bases by name to avoid giving the impression that they endorse a party's claim to the territory. To illustrate, Ecuador's *Base Sur* means "Southern Base" in Spanish. However, it is Peru's stance that *Base Sur* is in Northern Peru. Instead, MOMEF refers to the bases by code-names, i.e., Alpha, Charlie, Delta, etc. In addition, Observers installed large "MOMEF" signs over the top of belligerent markings at the base camps.

The US Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) maps of the Upper Cenepa conflictive zone depict Peru's version of the Rio Protocol trace along the 78 kilometer unmarked border section. To avoid unnecessary antagonisms, USSOUTHCOM printed a special DMZ map void of Rio Protocol references. MOMEF began using this special "impartial" DMZ map for all official business just prior to the integration of the Peruvians and Ecuadorans.

Separation of Forces.

MOMEF exercised impartiality in developing the plan to separate the belligerent forces from the conflictive zone. The idea of a military pullback or "Separation of Forces" was sensitive in both countries. Public officials believed pullbacks would compromise claims to sovereignty over the disputed areas. Both President Fujimori of

Peru and President Duran of Ecuador vowed they would not permit a military retreat from the border positions.⁸³

MOMEPEP initiated the Separation Plan by drawing a 20 km by 20 km Security Zone around the Upper Cenepa area where 3000 Ecuadoran troops remained intermingled with 2000 Peruvian troops. Over the next three weeks, MOMEPEP would supervise the phased extraction of belligerent forces from this Security Zone.

A smaller 5 x 7 km Security Zone would have been sufficient to accomplish the mission, however, this small Security Zone would have been entirely within what Peru considers their sovereign territory. This smaller Security Zone would make Peruvians feel penalized for an "Ecuadoran transgression." To demonstrate impartiality, MOMEPEP designed the 20 x 20 Km Zone that encompassed equal amounts of Peruvian and Ecuadoran territory, either side of the Rio Protocol line. Peru readily accepted this plan

During the Separation of Forces, Ecuador was eager to show MOMEPEP that they were in possession of bases in the conflict zone, particularly Base Sur and Tiwintza. The Ecuadorans believed the final positions at the start of the cease-fire would influence diplomatic discussions. Furthermore, during the war, Fujimori claimed Peru had retaken these bases. Ecuador wanted MOMEPEP to physically preside over the evacuation of Base Sur and Tiwintza, both to substantiate Ecuadoran claims and to embarrass President Fujimori by showing he had made false statements.⁸⁴ The evacuation ceremonies would be major Ecuadoran media events.

Peru's Presidential elections, 9 April 1995, were drawing near and President Fujimori was up for re-election. Fujimori had already taken harsh criticism from the Peruvian press for his mismanagement of the border area.⁸⁵ MOMEPEP looked for a way to accomplish the peacekeeping tasks without participating in events that could potentially alter the outcome of belligerent domestic politics.

MOMEPEP's solution to the dilemma was simple. Supervision of the separation did not require MOMEPEP's presence inside the Security Zone. MOMEPEP did not need to send observers into the Security Zone to watch the belligerents get on the evacuation helicopters. Instead, MOMEPEP observers would fulfill their supervisory responsibility by counting the belligerents and weapons as they got off the helicopters at control points, just outside the conflictive zone.

Designing a DMZ.

Designing the permanent Demilitarized Zone was also an exercise in impartiality. The DMZ design had to be palatable to both parties. The best potential solution was a Security Zone-style rectangle, using the formula of equal kilometers on each side of the Rio Protocol line.

⁸³ News Digest for February 1995, "Peru, Ecuador Sign Truce, Border Dispute Unresolved."

⁸⁴ "Says Ecuador Still Holds Border Positions." *Voz de los Andes*, reported in FBIS Latin America, 27 February 1995, p.29, and "Army Takes Reporters to Tihuinza," *Paris AFP*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 February 1995, p.63.

⁸⁵ "President Blamed for Origin, Handling of Conflict,," *Caretas* (No. 1349, 9 February 1995), in FBIS Latin America, 15 February 1995, p.73. also "Fujimori 'Lied' to Country," *Caretas*, in FBIS Latin America, 28 February 1995, p58.

Ecuador had two objections. First, the DMZ proposal used the Rio Protocol border as its baseline. Ecuador did not recognize the validity of this line. Ecuador's acceptance of such a permanent DMZ might infer concurrence with the Rio Protocol border. The second problem was that the proposed DMZ rectangle encompassed their Banderas base. The Ecuadoran Army wanted to retain Banderas because it was their key hub for civic action work with Shuar Indian community. Ecuador also felt that since Banderas was not involved in the conflict, it should not be part of the DMZ plan.

The Peruvian media became suspicious when they learned of Ecuadoran objections. One media report said that the Banderas was "a stronghold with approximately 1,000 soldiers who are equipped with lethal ground to ground and ground to air missiles that have laser systems that chase the target. The Banderas 'fortress' also had Chaparral missiles that would be able to strike troops at PV-1, 6kms away. Puma helicopters are permanently stationed there."⁸⁶

In reality, Banderas consisted of three Shuar families in grass huts, a Shuar one-room school house, and less than 20 Ecuadoran soldiers--equipped with small arms and a radio.

The MOMEPA Staff let Peruvian military and diplomatic negotiators know that Banderas was not a military "fortress." Peru was willing to concede the Banderas base to Ecuador, but not at the expense of an equitable division of the DMZ rectangle.

During a short break at the DMZ negotiations, COL Weidner sketched, on a napkin, a trapezoidal-shaped DMZ that would let Ecuador keep Banderas while ensuring DMZ equity. The parties accepted and ratified the idea quickly.

The belligerents made mutual concessions. Ecuador agreed to accept a DMZ designed on the basis of the disputed Rio Protocol line, and Peru conceded the Banderas base to Ecuador. Ecuador also agreed not to militarize Banderas or take advantage of its proximity to the DMZ. The DMZ went into effect on 1 August 1995.

Be Careful What You Say. MOMEPA PAO policies.

The MOMEPA Staff made themselves accessible to the media. They recognized their responsibility to keep the parties informed. MOMEPA made information available without compromising the mission. In the first months of the operation, MOMEPA held daily press conferences. The MOMEPA Staff prepared these press releases together, screening them for possible misinterpretations. To measure the effectiveness of their impartiality efforts, MOMEPA tracked belligerent daily newspapers and television programs to gauge host nation perceptions. MOMEPA had a few experiences that made them sensitive to the local media's tendency to manipulate information.

One such experience occurred during MOMEPA's initial reconnaissance of the battlefield in February 1995. Brazilian General Ariel Pereira, the first MOMEPA Coordinator General, commented that he was "moved" by the "Peruvian soldier's courage," after witnessing the arrival of several wounded, but uncomplaining, soldiers

⁸⁶ "Ecuador Conceals Border Stronghold From Rio Guarantors," *Lima Expreso*, in FBIS Latin America, 14 July 1995, p.25.

from the front. Ecuador interpreted the general's statements as evidence of "bias" and demanded his removal from the mission.⁸⁷

On another occasion, Ecuadoran reporters asked US Ambassador Peter Romero why MOMEP would not preside over the Ecuadoran ceremonies at Tiwintza and Base Sur during the Separation of Forces. Ambassador Romero replied that MOMEP was only a small force and heavily committed, and was not be able to visit every "small place" to attend ceremonies. The Ecuadorans took great offense that Ambassador Romero would refer to their heroic shrine of Tiwintza, their version of the Alamo, as a "small place" — *lugarcito* in Spanish. Although the Ambassador intended no offense, the media was extremely critical of his choice of words. One political party even demanded Ambassador Romero's removal from country for his comments and for "having sided against Ecuador during the conflict with Peru."⁸⁸

MOMEP was sensitive to presenting film or video images that might make them look biased. For example, belligerent demobilization ceremonies took on the air of "victory celebrations," with soldiers and families sometimes embracing MOMEP observers in spontaneous outbursts of emotion. The six o'clock news made it appear as if MOMEP was joining in the celebration.

SOUTHCOM's Armed Forces Radio and Television teams made several visits to Patuca. These media teams produced television and radio spots, and newspaper articles for broadcast in Panama. The SOUTHCOM effort focused on the daily routine of MOMEP peacekeepers and JTF Safe Border, purposely avoiding controversial political problems. COL Weidner restricted the television crew to the area in and around Patuca, sensing that former belligerents may be sensitive to filming the former battleground in the DMZ. Also no other Guarantor country had sent a media team to the conflict zone and COL Weidner did want not the US to set the precedent. He also had the SOUTHCOM film crews interview the Guarantor observers to emphasize the regional character of the mission. JTF Safe Border personnel could speak freely with reporters on their specific duties. All questions of a politico-military nature would be referred to the MOMEP Staff.

Telling the MOMEP Story in an Impartial Way.

Returning MOMEP peacekeepers often brief or write about the MOMEP story. Impartiality is as important in these briefings and articles as it is while on peacekeeping duty in the Upper Cenepa. It is particularly important when the audience might include Peruvian or Ecuadoran representation.

Since there are two distinct interpretations of the historical antecedents leading to the Peru-Ecuador dispute, briefers try to walk a line between the two explanations. It is difficult to provide useful or succinct information without appearing to lean in one direction or another. Briefers, whose goal it is to discuss MOMEP operations, are often

⁸⁷ 'Guarantor Nation's Observer Mission Arrives in Piura.' *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 13 March 1995, p.48. During MOMEP's stopover in Piura, the silence of the new Brazilian Coordinator General, General Freire, before the media was attributed to the "General Ariel Pereira Syndrome."

⁸⁸ "Political Party Demands Departure of US Ambassador," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 9 May 1995, page 46.

taken to issue on their interpretation of the historical antecedents in their introductory remarks.⁸⁹

Conclusion.

MOMEF worked hard to maintain the perception of impartiality throughout the mission. They recognized that the variable, "level of impartiality," needs to remain constant throughout the mission. Impartiality is not something that is achieved at the beginning of the mission and then forgotten.

PROVIDING FORCE PROTECTION TO MOMEF

The greater risks of recent peacekeeping missions have made security for peacekeepers a more salient issue than before.

Huldt

Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping⁹⁰.

The presence of force at the scene of a potential incident tends to diminish the confidence of would be aggressors.

FM 100-23⁹¹

You shouldn't allow the philosophy of "unarmed peacekeepers" to minimize your responsibility for force security.

JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations

Decision To Go Light.

MOMEF opted not to deploy a large security force to protect the peacekeepers. Mission analysis determined that the threat level was low, there was a high level of consent, no significant local population, and well-disciplined belligerent forces. The belligerents also perceived MOMEF as a legitimate peacekeeping force. Planners can feel pressure to send armed troops to avoid accusations of "being lulled into the belief that the non-hostile intent of the Peacekeeping mission protects the force."⁹² MOMEF accepted some risk by going in lightly armed. By accepting risk, MOMEF created a climate of trust between peacekeepers and belligerents and maintained their overall deployment figures low.

⁸⁹ Luna, p.7. The Peruvian Ambassador to the US criticized COL Weidner's article "Operation Safe Border," for interpreting historical events from what he felt was the "Ecuadoran" point of view.

⁹⁰ Huldt, p.115.

⁹¹ FM 100-23, p.34.

⁹² FM 100-23, p.17.

Forces to Protect.

MOMEF forces allocated to force protection were limited to JTF Safe Border's six-man military police element from US Army South, Panama. These MPs provided access control to the MOMEF Operations Center and convoy escort.

Because MOMEF's base in Patuca was inside the Ecuadoran 21st Jungle Brigade compound, MOMEF benefited from the Ecuadoran Brigade's external and internal security plan. This security arrangement was very effective. In the first 200 days of the mission, MOMEF soldiers reported only one missing item, a laundry bag.

The JTF Safe Border units left behind in Panama, all assigned M16A2 rifles, M240 machine guns, and the UH-60A helicopter M60D door guns. The intent was to project a non-threatening, non-intimidating, peace observer mission. The presence of heavily armed troops often heightens tensions and gives the impression that the peace process is not going well. Besides, the belligerents were fully aware that the United States had the technological capability to respond swiftly if US peacekeepers were harmed. It was not necessary to have a "show of force" capability living in the Upper Cenepa to drive the point home.

MOMEF Observers and JTF Safe Border personnel use 9mm pistols for personal protection. The observers draw their pistols from the arms room only when on MOMEF missions. Observers carry pistols for symbolic reasons, as a badge of rank, but also as a precaution against hazards of the jungle wilds. MOMEF's Rules of Engagement (ROE) are standard--observers use force in self-defense only.

Passive Force Protection Measures.

MOMEF was not cavalier about security. They took several actions to reduce the vulnerability of their force, relying principally on passive protection measures.

MOMEF, particularly in the early days of the mission, ensured that observer movements were highly visible, announced, and non-threatening. MOMEF's physical security depended on the absence of surprises. MOMEF did not want to add to the uncertainty on the Cenepa battlefield. The observers wore white hats and shoulder brassards. MOMEF displayed clearly marked signs on their jungle outpost operations centers. The pilots flew non-combat, administrative, flight profiles. JTF Safe Border's Aviation element painted three white "bumble-bee" pattern stripes around the fuselage of the four UH60A Blackhawk helicopters. The external fuel tanks were also painted white. MOMEF printed fliers describing the observer mission and depicting UH60A helicopter with markings. These fliers were distributed throughout the belligerent ground forces in the conflict zone.⁹³

MOMEF recognized that the biggest threat to observer operations was the unpredictable weather and treacherous jungle environment. Heavy, low-hanging cloud banks moved quickly in and out of the Cenepa area. With no warning, these clouds could close in and block a helicopter's flight path or exit route. The Cenepa's steep, vaulted terrain with 70 foot high jungle canopy presented few emergency landing zones. The

⁹³ In the 1981 conflict a Peruvian helicopter was shot down by Ecuadoran stragglers that had not been informed that a cease-fire was in effect. In "The Peruvian-Ecuadorian Border Incident in the Cordillera del Condor--1981." The SOUTHCOM PSYOPS section produced the fliers for MOMEF.

USAF Weather station in Patuca assisted planners in the safe scheduling of rotary and fixed wing operations. MOMEF tried to restrict air operations to 1100-1600 hrs when flying conditions were most favorable. As an added precaution, the Aviation Element flew all missions into the DMZ in pairs. They wanted to avoid situations like the 1981 Ecuador observer mission when a UH1H, flying solo, went down in the remote mountainous region. Search parties never found the wreckage.

Initially, MOMEF coordinated their flight plans into the Security Zone with both belligerent forces. Once the DMZ was in effect, MOMEF assumed control of the airspace and the parties requested permission from MOMEF to enter the DMZ.

In the first five months of the mission, the C27 pilots did not fly the direct route from Patuca to Bagua when shuttling the MOMEF staff. The direct route went directly over the conflictive zone, where air defense systems were still at heightened alert. The C27s flew a circuitous route along accepted commercial routes, to work their way into and out of Bagua. Once MOMEF's confidence building measures brought the parties trust levels up, the C27 pilots made the straight flight into Bagua, resulting in great savings in fuel and time.

MOMEF's newcomers received a complete aviation safety orientation. Also each observer missions began with an aviation brief, where safety and emergency action procedures were reviewed.

JTF Safe Border routinely rehearsed their Personnel Recovery (PR) team procedures. One UH-60A Blackhawk was equipped with a hoist, giving the PR team the capability to lower rescuers through the jungle canopy or onto steep terrain.

MOMEF used the Ecuadoran 21st Jungle Brigade's aviation fuel. This fuel was of good quality. However, as additional safety measure, JTF Safe Border's fuel handler ran the fuel through his filtering system before refueling the UH60As.

The DMZ's landing zones, cut in the tall jungle canopy, made for very tight landings. Heavy rains turned the LZs into soft mud. MOMEF helicopters often flew heavily loaded and at high altitudes--making landings even more challenging. To aid pilots in their landings, MOMEF emplaced windsocks at each LZ.

SOUTHCOM sent a US Air Force Crash Fire Rescue team with fire truck to Patuca for coverage of fixed and rotary wing operations or other base camp emergencies.

Anti-personnel mines were another hazard to observer operations. The MOMEF Staff restricted observer operations to the landing zones due to the estimated 6,000 mines still buried throughout the DMZ area. These mines had been emplaced on the LZ perimeters and along trails and streambeds. Heavy rains occasionally dislodged these mines, sweeping them downstream, at times causing self-detonation. The observers treated all streams as danger areas

Jungle life could be hazardous. Snakebite is the leading cause of death among the Shuar Indians. Bat-bites are a common peril. Cases of meningitis and hepatitis appeared among the Ecuadoran and Peruvian soldiers out on the jungle outposts. The JTF Safe Border Medical team conducted safety and jungle orientation classes for all observers.

Conclusion

MOMEPE directed their force protection efforts against the natural hazards presented by the Upper Amazon. The lightly armed MOMEPE peacekeeping contingent fostered trust among the former belligerents, contributing to the accelerated integration of the parties into the peacekeeping force. This also resulted in a reduced troop presence for MOMEPE.

VERIFYING COMPLIANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Where cooperation of the parties is not sustained and whole-hearted, a positive result will be difficult to obtain.

David Wainhouse
International Peace Observation⁹⁴

The success or failure of a peacekeeping operation may depend on the kinds of conflict into which they are introduced.

Paul F. Diehl
International Peacekeeping⁹⁵

MOMEPE enjoyed success, in large part, because it was introduced into the right "kind of conflict." MOMEPE enjoyed a high level of consent from the belligerents, the dispute was an interstate conflict, the border zone was sparsely populated, there were no NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations) or PVOs (Private Volunteer Organizations), and MOMEPE did not have to react to the "CNN effect." These environmental characteristics made it easier for MOMEPE to conduct peace operations and verify that the parties were in compliance with the accords.

Right Kind of Dispute

The Peru-Ecuador dispute was an interstate conflict limited to two actors, a much more suitable environment for peace observers. The two actors, Peru and Ecuador, were easy to identify. Both wore uniforms and belonged to disciplined armies, making them easy to separate. Both occupy different geographical areas. Ecuador and Peru are democracies, similar in ideology to the Guarantor observers.⁹⁶ In contrast, civil conflicts are much more difficult to control. The conflict in Lebanon, for example, involved more than a half-dozen indigenous political factions, each with its own militia, the PLO,

⁹⁴ Quoted in Diehl, p.79.

⁹⁵ Diehl, 62.

⁹⁶ As a side note, DR Marcella says that the thesis that "democracies don't go to war with each other because democracy constrains the use of force in both domestic and international affairs and because democracies share the same values," was seriously challenged by the Peru-Ecuador conflict. Marcella, p.4.

terrorist groups, and Israel and Syria. The more actors, the harder it is to please all sides and the greater the likelihood that someone will break the cease-fire.⁹⁷

High Level of Consent and Cooperation.

Both countries, in order to enhance their image with MOMEF and gain sympathy for their position, were meticulous in giving their full support and cooperation. MOMEF had legitimacy in the eyes of the former belligerent armed forces as well as civilian populations. Both countries "endorsed and respected the efforts of the guarantors."⁹⁸

The Geography of the Peacekeeping Environment.

Peacekeeping forces are likely to be most effective when they are the only group in the area, and hostile movements will be the most obvious.

Paul F. Diehl

International Peacekeeping⁹⁹

MOMEF had a clean battlefield. Although the difficult geography and weather of the Cenepa presented an operational challenge, this same hostile environment, however, created circumstances that facilitated MOMEF's job as peace observers.

Sparse Civilian Population

Peacekeeping missions become overburdened when they are also expected to resolve the massive human catastrophe created by the conflict. The Cenepa's small civilian population, coupled with adequate government infrastructure, allowed MOMEF to focus exclusively on peace operations.

The Upper Cenepa is sparsely populated by the Shuar, Ashuar, Huambisa and the Aguarana groups of Jibara peoples. They live in groups of three to ten grass huts, widely dispersed through the jungle. The Upper Cenepa area is suitable only for hunting fishing and gathering. The Indians plant small subsistence plots of bananas, maize, and cassava. Attempts at intensive rice or corn have quickly ended in severe soil erosion. The soils are poor, with steep inclinations and rain all year round.¹⁰⁰

Figures quoted on the war's impact on civilians vary, but all are on the low side. Land mines injured a total of 28 civilians. During the most tense moments of the war, the Ecuadorans evacuated close to 12000 civilians from the border zone as a precautionary measure. Most displaced civilians returned home after a few days.¹⁰¹ The Latin American

⁹⁷ Diehl, p 77-78.

⁹⁸ "Ecuadoran Demilitarization Stance Examined," *Lima El Comercio*, 28 June 95, pA2, reported in FBIS Latin America, p.59

⁹⁹ Diehl, p.70

¹⁰⁰ Abraham Lama, "Indigenous Peoples, the Invisible Victims of War," Interpress Third World News Agency (IPS), URL: <<http://web.maxwell.syr.edu.nativew...aphy/latinam/ecuador/border16.html>>, accessed 10 November 1996, pp. 1-2.

¹⁰¹ "Evacuees in Loja Number 12,000," *Quito Hoy*, in FBIS Latin America, 14 February 1995, p.41

Human Rights Association reported that 3000 Indians had to evacuate the area permanently as a result of the conflict.¹⁰²

Civilians have avoided returning to the 528 square kilometer DMZ area. The 6,000 still unrecovered mines in the zone hinder resettlement plans.

No NGOs or PVOs.

NGOs bring needed relief to the conflictive zone, but often complicate the peacekeeping operation by working at cross purposes with the mission commander. The small displaced civilian problem negated the need for a strong NGO presence. MOMEP was the sole international body controlling events in the border area. MOMEP did not have to compromise or negotiate plans with NGOs.¹⁰³

Remote and Dull.

The MOMEP did not have to react to the "CNN effect." The extreme remoteness of the region, coupled with relatively low interest in the story, kept the international news crews away. On the positive side, the news media was not critiquing MOMEP's most minor decisions. On the down side, the story of "world's most successful peacekeeping operation" is a tree falling in the forest.¹⁰⁴

Verification and Supervision of the DMZ Were Greatly Simplified.

The low population density offsets MOMEP's problem of sorting out hostile activity. There is no civilian traffic inside the DMZ. Any movement, tracks, smoke, reflection, or man-made materials found within or near the DMZ is a sign of concern or further investigation. There is no need to discriminate and screen civilian activity like peacekeepers in Belfast must do, for example.

The aerial patrols are most effective in monitoring the area. Observers on ground operations at the fixed landing zones have limited visibility (50-75 meters) due to the dense jungle vegetation. However, the soft mud in and around the LZs makes it easy for them to spot any foot traffic through these key nodes.

¹⁰² "Native Communities Threatened by Peru-Ecuador Conflict," *Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia*, 6 February 1995, in *FBIS Latin America*, p.36. The author's personal estimate is that this figure is now less than 500. Other reports include "Red Cross reports 7,500 Refugees, 50,000 Unemployed," *Hamburg DPA*, in *FBIS Latin America*, 27 February 1995, p.34. A Human Rights Group said there was more than 500 dead or wounded and missing, and 50,000 evacuated and forced into refugee status in, "Editorial Report on EU Assistance for Refugee Indians," *Quito EL Comercio*, in *FBIS Latin America*, 20 September 1995, p.31.

¹⁰³ There was some minor NGO involvement. The European Union, through its European Humanitarian Office (ECHO) gave \$580,000 in aid to the Indian population in the conflictive zone. It was planned and administered by Italian NGO Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI). They gave 2500 Indian families--17,000 people--assistance in the form of rice, sugar, oil, salt, beans, kitchen utensils, stoves and gas cylinders. This was a short term emergency aid project. In "Editorial Report on EU Assistance for Refugee Indians," *Quito EL Comercio*, in *FBIS Latin America*, 20 September 1995.

¹⁰⁴ LTG Zinni, USMC, Deputy Commander, CENTCOM was told by CNN representative during the successful Somalia evacuation, "This operation is boring General, you are a success." US Institute of Peace Conference, "Media's Impact on International Affairs," shown on C-SPAN, 2 April 1997.

The Dense Jungle.

Despite MOMEF's advantages in monitoring the DMZ, the jungle terrain offers plenty of concealment for either party to infiltrate small 5-10 man patrols into the DMZ without being detected. Although, it would be hard to sustain a company-size element in the area for any length of time without leaving a signature, a small patrol, that avoided observer outposts, moved at night, and stayed hidden during the day, could operate within the DMZ without being discovered.

These small patrols, however, would achieve minimal gain with maximum risk. Discovery would be a major embarrassment and loss of credibility with the Guarantor countries, impacting negatively on the entire peace process. This deters the parties from even considering the option.

MOMEF Routine for Verifying Compliance

MOMEF conducts three types of verification mission within the DMZ. The first, is the permanent operations centers located at the Ecuadoran base of Coangos and the Peruvian base of PV1. These three day observer rotations ensure that the troop strength at the posts remain below fifty, that no patrols are conducted, and that no indirect fire weapons are introduced. The second type of mission is the temporary operations centers. MOMEF establishes temporary operations centers twice a week at the former bases of Tiwintza and Base Sur. These missions are three to four hours in duration. The last type of mission is the air patrol conducted twice weekly by the UH 60As and observers. The patrols fly varied routes over different sections of the DMZ, looking for evidence of unauthorized movement. MOMEF has also conducted verification missions at PV-2 (Peru) and Banderas (Ecuador). These bases are located just outside the DMZ. MOMEF ensures that belligerents do not try to build up forces close to the DMZ, defeating the purpose of the peace accord.

MOMEF Operational Techniques.

During MOMEF's two years of operations they have been faced with different peacekeeping challenges and they have adopted special techniques to handle them.

Separation of Forces.

During the Separation of Forces phase, it was simple MOMEF presence that was key in inducing the belligerents to abandon their hard-won battlefield positions. MOMEF presence allowed both sides to pull back honorably and extract themselves from the conflictive zone without implication of defeat or surrender.

During each increment of the phased withdrawal, the MOMEF observers recorded the name and weapon serial numbers of each soldier as they disembarked from the helicopters. The primary value of these lists was psychological. The belligerent confidence levels in the peace process were reinforced knowing that MOMEF was using this same attention to detail with their former adversary.

MOMEF also accelerated or slowed down the rate of the phased Separation Plan to ensure that both parties were evacuating soldiers from the battlefield at an equal rate. Adverse weather caused the Peruvian evacuations to fall behind schedule on a few

occasions. MOMEPE advised the Ecuadorans to delay their troop movements until Peru caught up. MOMEPE's balanced oversight had a positive effect on Ecuador's trust level. The belligerents' biggest fear was that their opponent would renege and move in and occupy the abandoned positions.

Another MOMEPE confidence-builder was to initiate aerial patrolling immediately following the evacuation of a sector of the battlefield. These patrols verified that the area was not being reoccupied by the belligerents. Again these flights had great psychological value at a time when it was most needed.

Supervision of the Demobilization.

MOMEPE presided over nationwide demobilization ceremonies in May 95. The number of locations and quantities of soldiers made it impossible for MOMEPE to verify the demobilization process man for man as they had done during Separation of Forces from the conflict zone. MOMEPE's value again was in their symbolic presence at the ceremonies. MOMEPE presence assured the parties that demobilization was occurring simultaneously on both sides of the border.

Handling Cease-fire Violations.

MOMEPE would receive cease-fire violation incident reports nearly simultaneously from both parties. They would study the circumstances to see why the incident occurred and what measures could be taken to prevent a recurrence. MOMEPE avoided issuing "guilty" verdicts against a party. Their primary focus was to identify the conditions that led to the cease-fire violation. The MOMEPE Staff launched investigations promptly and issued warnings immediately. There was never a long lag time between incident and response.

The single biggest trouble-spot was the Etza Viejo-Chiquieza area, 50 kilometers northeast of the DMZ. Over 20 cease-fire violations occurred in this area from July through September 1995. Peru and Ecuador disagreed over the placement of a border marker at this site, leading to complaints by both parties that the other's routine patrols were trespassing sovereign territory. These routine patrols regularly exchanged gunfire and mortar fire.

It became obvious to MOMEPE that warnings and reprimands were ineffective. MOMEPE responded by creating Zone A. Using same methodology employed in the conflict zone, MOMEPE began by drawing a 20 kilometer by 5 kilometer "Control Zone," around the problematic area. Within this control zone troop strengths would remain at reduced levels, no active patrolling would take place, and no indirect fire or crew-served weapons would be permitted. MOMEPE initiated regular visits and aerial patrols over the Zone A outposts. Zone A put an immediate end to all cease-fire violations. MOMEPE demonstrated flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness in bringing a problematic border situation under control.

Confidence Building Measures.

MOMEPE developed a series of confidence building measures that progressively built up the trust levels between the two parties. MOMEPE began with simple and easily accepted procedures and worked their way up to the increasingly difficult and more

controversial measures. MOMEP's goal was to build mutual confidence so the political process of border definition could continue uninterrupted by outbreaks of violence.

MOMEP daily operations were the bedrock of confidence building. With MOMEP presence, the protagonists no longer feared a surprise attack. They no longer felt the need to take preemptive action.¹⁰⁵

In July 1995, the Peruvians and Ecuadorans coordinated for the first of a series of body recovery missions from the DMZ. Both Peru and Ecuador shared the mutual goal of recovering the remains of their fallen soldiers. This humanitarian mission was easily accepted by both parties. All the body recovery missions required cooperation and coordination between the parties. These missions were the "ice-breakers," that brought the two former belligerents together again.¹⁰⁶

The integration of the Peruvians and Ecuadorans into MOMEP was the single most important confidence builder. Integration gave the former belligerents transparency of operations. Rumors of troop build-ups were quickly dismissed when Peruvian and Ecuadoran observers arrived on the scene. "Ground truth," relaxed tension.

In September 1995, MOMEP also began promoting bilateral dialogue between the two operational commanders through a telephone "hot-line." General Carlos Calle, Commander of the 4th Amazon Jungle Division and General Luis Perez, Commander of the Peruvian 6th Military Region had their first phone conversation described as a "dialogue between gentlemen...proving the goodwill that prevails between the two countries to begin direct contact."¹⁰⁷ This telephone line was part of the mutual support plan developed to respond to border incidents.

Several measures were taken to ease tensions at unit level along the border posts. MOMEP helped implement a Combined Border Security Guide that gave the two parties common procedures for operating along the frontier.

Commanders organized soccer games among the border posts. These games were played with "mixed" teams. Each 11-man team included both Ecuadorans and Peruvians. The focus was on fun and camaraderie. The soccer game could not then become "a continuation of war by other means."

On Easter Sunday 1997, an Ecuadoran priest and Peruvian Chaplain gave a combined service at Border Marker #21. This service was attended by General Officers from Peru and Ecuador.

¹⁰⁵ Diehl, p.35.

¹⁰⁶ "Details of MOMEP Consultative Committee Meeting Disclosed," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 20 November 1995, p.54.

¹⁰⁷ General Calle quoted in "Military Chief, Peruvian Commander Speak by Phone," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 September 1995, p.33.

Take your toys and go home.

Withdrawal is a powerful incentive for the parties to control their actions and thus maintain the peace.

DR David S. Alberts and DR Richard Hayes
Command Arrangements for Peace Operations¹⁰⁸

Concessions are more often forthcoming when there is pressure to reach an agreement; it is not surprising that conciliatory actions tend to increase as a deadline for settlement approaches.

Paul F. Diehl
International Peacekeeping¹⁰⁹

MOMEF made headway in the peace process by using the “renewal or withdrawal” carrot and stick. The first breakthrough came in late July 95 with the DMZ approval. MOMEF had already passed their first renewal deadline when the parties agreed to go forward with the DMZ proposal. The second breakthrough, the full integration of the former belligerents into MOMEF, came as the mission approached its second renewal deadline.

The Guarantors opted to extend the MOMEF mission in 90 or 179 day increments to create frequent opportunities for renewal deadline “breakthroughs.”

As the frequent extensions become more routine, however, they will carry less weight. If belligerents sense that the mission is settling-in, a stalemate in negotiations can result.

The incremental extension technique has a negative consequence for the peacekeepers. MOMEF cannot make long term personnel rotation plans or resource decisions, since the mission is “temporary.” For continuity purposes, it might be preferable to assign key MOMEF personnel for one-year tours. The temporary nature of the mission, makes it difficult for US military personnel managers to send people for more than 179-days. Likewise equipment resources are likely to remain on temporary loan from US combat units for the duration of the “temporary” mission.

¹⁰⁸ Alberts and Hayes, p.18.

¹⁰⁹ Diehl, p.102.

AVOIDING MISSION CREEP.

The longer we stay the more they want us to do.

Secretary of Defense William Cohen on Bosnia
Capitol Hill Briefing, 14 February 1997¹¹⁰

MOMEPE's advantage as a small organization is that they simply did not have the assets to do extra missions outside the mandate. MOMEPE personnel are fully committed to the peacekeeping mission. Large peacekeeping deployments, with major force protection packages, may be tempted to take on additional projects because they have the capability or want to keep troops gainfully employed. MOMEPE's Brazilian leadership knew from their experience in Angola and Mozambique that objectives can be blurred and logistics and planning problems can multiply when a peacekeeping operation tries to overstretch its mandate.¹¹¹

Humanitarian relief is an area where the peacekeepers, supplies and equipment can be deflected. This never became a problem in the Upper Cenepa because both belligerent government support infrastructures were more than sufficient to handle the small number of displaced civilians. During the conflict there was a surge of Ecuadoran and Peruvian medical support into the area.¹¹²

In August 1995, the SOUTHCOM staff considered asking for MOMEPE assistance to reinitiate the search for the wreckage of a 1981 UH1H helicopter crash. The US crew went down in mountainous region 150 kms south of Patuca. SOUTHCOM had been encouraged by MOMEPE's success in finding three of the six Peruvian crash sites from the 1995 conflict. SOUTHCOM withdrew their proposal when they determined that the diversion of observer assets would have a major impact on MOMEPE's daily operations.

Demining.

MOMEPE has parried requests to supervise the demining effort in the DMZ.¹¹³ Supervising demining would be a major responsibility that could have diverted MOMEPE from their primary peace operation focus of separation of forces, establishing a DMZ, and verifying compliance.

In January 1995, Ecuador and Peru laid approximately 60,000 mines, both anti-tank and anti-personnel, in conventionally marked minefields, along the length of their common frontier. By August 1995, the parties recovered the majority of these mines.¹¹⁴ Inside the DMZ, however, about 6,000 anti-personnel mines still remain.

¹¹⁰ C-SPAN, 14 February 1997.

¹¹¹ Angela Kane, "Other Selected States: Motivations and Factors in National Choices," in Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping, eds Donald CF Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, p.138.

¹¹² "400 Medical Personnel to Front," Expreso, in FBIS Latin America, 8 March 1995, p.50.

¹¹³ "MOMEPE Liaison General on Mine Problems in Border Area," Quito Voz de los Andes, in FBIS Latin America, 28 February 1997.

¹¹⁴ "Minister Leoro: Banderas Not In Demilitarized Zone," Quito Voz de los Andes, in FBIS Latin America, 2 August 1995, p.28, and "GEN Paco Moncayo Reveals Remaining Mines Only in DMZ," Guayaquil EL Universo, in FBIS Latin America, 2 August 1995, p.39.

The location of many of these DMZ mines are recorded. Combat engineers have provided MOMEPE with minefield sketches of the mine emplacements on base camp perimeters, jungle trails and stream beds.

Some mine locations are not recorded. During the heat of combat, soldiers tossed pursuit deterrent mines in the path of the enemy advance. Precise locations and numbers are not known.

Heavy rains, tremors, and rapid growth of vegetation have altered the DMZ jungle floor considerably in the last two years. Some mines have self-detonated due to this natural turbulence. However, many still active mines have been washed-out and dislodged from their recorded emplacement sites. Elephant grass has engulfed the basecamp perimeters. Trails have disappeared from lack of use. Minefield reference points may be now unrecognizable, complicating the eventual demining effort.

During the Separation of Forces phase, the Ecuadorans were unable to recover all anti-personnel mines prior to abandoning the jungle bases.¹¹⁵ Upon extraction, Ecuadoran engineers volunteered to return to the evacuated bases and begin demining. In this early stage, confidence levels between the belligerents were non-existent. Peru would not have allowed Ecuador to go back into what they considered Peruvian sovereign territory.

More significantly, the supervision of the demining effort would fall directly under MOMEPE. MOMEPE was not equipped to provide oversight of the demining. Although, the parties would shoulder the effort, MOMEPE would have incurred supervisory responsibility to back up their efforts with communications, medical, and aviation support.

MOMEPE's position is that the parties should execute the demining effort through security assistance channels¹¹⁶ Last year, Ecuador had planned to conduct demining training with a 7th Special Forces Group Mobile Training Team (MTT), from Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Five of the six MTT members were former JTF Safe Border participants and quite familiar with the problem. Unfortunately, the mission was canceled due to lack of funding. There is no demining training projected in the near future.

MOMEPE maintains all mine data on file and plots key mine information on maps and photo-mosaics for observer briefs, but also to develop a historical file for the eventual demining effort.

¹¹⁵ "GEN Paco Moncayo Reveals Remaining Mines Only in DMZ," *Guayaquil EL Universo*, in FBIS Latin America, 2 August 1995, p.39.

¹¹⁶ "MOMEPE To Increase Border Oversight Operations," *Lima Radio Programas del Peru*, in FBIS Latin America, 28 February 1997.

FINANCING MOMEPE.

This observer mission (MOMEPE) is being conducted at essentially no cost to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. Ecuador and Peru agreed to provide \$15,000 daily, a bargain if compared to fighting the war--a half billion dollars for one month of skirmishing.

General Barry McCaffrey
Commander in Chief, USSOUTHCOM¹¹⁷

The expenses should be borne by those who benefit most by the operation—the protagonists.

Paul F. Diehl
International Peacekeeping¹¹⁸

MOMEPE mission is funded “by those who benefit most by the operation,” the former belligerents. Belligerent funding has had a positive psychological effect on contributing countries for two reasons. Guarantor policy makers do not see MOMEPE as a financial drain, like many other peacekeeping missions worldwide. The Guarantors interpret belligerent funding as a sign that the parties are committed to the peace process. Belligerent funding makes it more likely that the Guarantors will continue to support the mission.

The enormous economic cost of war, quotes as high as \$900 million, was a major factor in bringing Ecuador and Peru to the peace table. The memory of these staggering expenditures acts as a deterrent to renewal of hostilities. The \$15,000 a day that belligerents are spending on MOMEPE is a comparative “bargain” to war, but is nonetheless a nuisance that might act as an incentive to reach a definitive agreement. As

¹¹⁷ McCaffrey, p.46 and “Experts Concerned Over Economic Impact of War,” *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS, Latin America, 7 February 1995, p.39. Peruvian economists estimated that Peru spent \$100 million in the first week of the war, and the 8 percent drop in the Lima stock exchange resulted in a \$400 million loss. In “Newspaper Reports \$10 Million Spent Daily on Conflict,” *El Comercio*, in FBIS Latin America, 8 February 1995, p.52, Ecuadoran economic analysts reported that Ecuador was incurring \$10 million in military expenses per day as a result of the border conflict. President Duran-Ballen had to impose special taxes on vehicles and a two percent salary tax to muster resources. A ten-day national telethon was also organized to raise funds. The Peruvian Economic Ministry reported that the war was costing an estimated \$5 million a day in “Spending On Conflict More Than Planned, ‘Not Yet’ Affecting Economy,” *Buenos Aires TELAM*,” in FBIS Latin America, 15 February 1995, p.66. A Human Rights organization said that the war was costing both sides combined \$30 million daily in routine spending, in addition to \$147 million in damaged or downed aircraft in “Human Rights Body Evaluates Peru-Ecuador Conflict,” *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 28 February 1995, p.4. Ecuadorans did a wrap-up estimating the total cost of the war at \$680 million. Estimates were \$250 million for the 31-days of war plus \$430 million in losses in productions and sales. This amount is equivalent to 3 percent of Ecuador’s GDP, in “Total Cost of War With Peru Reportedly \$680 Million,” *EL COMERCIO*, Quito, 2 April 1995, reported in FBIS Latin America, 3 April 1995, p.40. Finally with costs of demobilization included some Ecuadoran government officials quoted a \$900 million price tag, in “Conflict With Peru Used as Pretext for ‘Economic War,’” *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 8 June 1995, p.25.

¹¹⁸ Diehl, 76.

of 31 March 1997, Ecuador has been billed \$5.6 million and had paid \$4.72 million. Peru had been billed \$5.8 million and had paid \$5.1 million.¹¹⁹

The relatively small size of the MOMEPE mission keeps the price of the peacekeeping operation within the grasp of the belligerents. Ecuador and Peru are developed countries that have the financial capability to cover the costs.

For the Guarantors, however, MOMEPE is not completely cost free. The Guarantors cannot charge the belligerents for the hidden costs of the commitment of key personnel and equipment and the wear and tear on the helicopters. Personnel committed to the MOMEPE operation are more than the in-country figures reflect. Under the "3 for 1 rule," one group is currently assigned to MOMEPE, a second group of designated replacements is conducting pre-deployment activities, and there is third group newly returned, that must refit and retrain on lost combat skills.

Guarantor key personnel are tied-up manning MOMEPE billets. Brazil permanently maintains a General Officer and two Colonels. The US Contingent Commanders have been serving US Military Group Commanders in Honduras and El Salvador. US security assistance programs in those two countries felt their absence. The MOMEPE mission diverts Special Force soldiers and Aviation crew members from counternarcotics training initiatives in Latin America. This gives the Guarantors their own strong incentive to bring the mission to a close.

¹¹⁹ Ben Barber, "GIs Wage Quiet Peacekeeping in Ecuadoran Jungle," Washington Times, 10 June 1997, p.1.

SECTION V
FUTURE OF CONFLICT, FUTURE OF MOMEPE,
and CONCLUSIONS

Future of Peru-Ecuador Conflict

We must be realistic and understand that a solution to this problem is not feasible. I do not think that those auspicious developments (bilateral talks) should lead us to think that there will be a solution, because there is no solution. We should not fool ourselves anymore. There can be no solution, because a solution would have to please the two countries; and to please Ecuador, we would have to give that country a sovereign and territorial exit to the Amazonas-Maranon. And no Peruvian Government would be willing to do that.

Ambassador Felipe Valdivieso
Peru
18 April 1997¹²⁰

We did not come to hold a dialogue (bilateral talks) among deaf persons; that would not be in the spirit of the Itamaraty Declaration. Peru has a clear position. It is obviously different to that of Ecuador's. The Peruvian Foreign Minister, however, voiced his determination to dialogue, to advance. Thus I hope that this good spirit will prevail and that we can achieve progress.

Foreign Minister Jose Ayala Lasso
Ecuador
18 April 1997¹²¹

Since signing the Itamaraty Accord in February 1995, Peru and Ecuador have taken several positive strides towards improving bilateral relationships and reaching a long term solution to their border problem. Along with the encouraging steps, however, there is still tension.

On 25 October 1995, 10 months after the war, Ecuador lifted the State of Emergency. The Ecuadoran Court of Constitutional Guarantees said that, "The state of emergency is no longer in effect because the pacification process between Ecuador and Peru is progressing with no problem whatsoever."¹²² Ecuadoran General Cesar Duran Abad concurred, "We are on the right path. We have reached the appropriate level of

¹²⁰ "Peru: Minister, Ambassador on Guarantors, Conflict With Ecuador," *Lima Radio Programas del Peru*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 April 1997.

¹²¹ "Ecuador: Foreign Minister Refers to Meeting With Peru in Brasilia," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 April 1997.

¹²² "State of Emergency in Effect Since War With Peru Lifted," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 26 October 1995, p.37.

trust."¹²³ General Paco Moncayo added, "Our neighboring countries are united by cultural, commercial, and even familiar ties that should not be strained on account of positions adopted by governments."¹²⁴

In January 1997, two years after the conflict, President Bucaram became the first president in Ecuador's 183 year history to visit Peru. Fujimori and Bucaram embraced, Fujimori waving a miniature Ecuadoran flag, Bucaram waving the Peruvian flag. Each promised to increase the bonds of friendship and unite their countries, commercially, socially, and politically. Bucaram was ousted weeks later,¹²⁵ but his replacement, President Fabian Alarcon, telephoned Fujimori re-affirming that he would continue the policy of pacification and that he "favored the deepening of confidence and friendship between the two countries, helping Ecuador and Peru come to a common position, reconcile their interests, and solve their differences in a mutually acceptable manner."¹²⁶

On 15 April 1997 and 15 May 1997, Ecuador and Peru met in Brasilia to discuss the "prevailing impasses," signaling the first time in 50 years that the two countries conducted direct talks on the border issue. "Impasse" is the term given to the historic disagreements regarding the common border. Under the Itamaraty Declaration, the parties had agreed "to begin talks with a view to finding a solution to the existing deadlock."¹²⁷

In these first two bilateral meetings, the six impasses were presented. Ecuador now wants to open negotiations to resolve the issues. However, Peru claims that under the Itamaraty Accord they agreed only to discuss the impasses, not to resolve them. Despite this "impasse within the impasses," these breakthrough bilateral discussions are a major step toward arriving at a long term solution to the border dispute.

Some military developments have placed a chill on thawing Peru-Ecuador relations. Ecuador and Peru have made mutual accusations of launching arms races. There is talk of "secret war plans" as well as military posturing along the frontier.

Ecuador purchased four Kfir fighter planes from Israel, Peru twelve MiG 29s from Belarus. Both belligerents deny accusations of a buildup. Both claim that they are only replacing worn-out equipment and that they are exercising their right to purchase weapons for normal defense and deterrence.¹²⁸ However, both countries question the

¹²³ "Officer: Peace Process With Peru 'on Right Path,'" *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 17 November 1995, p.39.

¹²⁴ "Army Commander Praises Fujimori," in *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 5 September 1995, p.51.

¹²⁵ The Ecuadoran Legislative Branch ousted President Bucaram on 6 February 1997, due to "mental inability to govern." He had been inaugurated in August 1996.

¹²⁶ Embassy of Ecuador, Washington DC, "Interim President Alarcon Reiterates Ecuador's Position on the Territorial Dispute With Peru," 26 February 1997, URL <<http://www.ecuador.org/ecuador/press/27.html>>, accessed on 15 May 1997 and "Interim President Receives Visitors at Protocol Ceremony," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 21 February 1997.

¹²⁷ "Ecuador: Document Analyses Four Impasses," *Guayaquil EL Universo*, 25 March 1997, in FBIS Latin America, 28 March 1997, and "Ecuador, Peru Issue Order of Discussion of Impasses," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 18 April 1997. and "Ecuador; Foreign Minister Refers to Meeting With Peru in Brasilia," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 28 April 1997

¹²⁸ Ecuador had also been accused of buying 200 Strella air defense missiles from in Bulgaria (\$20 million) in, "Military: Ecuador Buying Arms From Bulgaria," *LA Republica*, in FBIS Latin America, 22 March 1995, p.75. The Ecuadoran media reports that Peru intends to buy eight SCUD launchers and 32 missiles

other's sincerity in wanting to reach a peace agreement. Ecuador charged that, "Peru is engaged in a gigantic campaign to purchase weapons which include tanks, aircraft, helicopters, radars, warships, missiles, submarines, and military supplies."¹²⁹

To bring this perception of a spiraling arms race under control, Peru and Ecuador have held five bilateral meetings in April-May 1997 of the "Arms Transparency Commission." The goal of these meetings is to allow each country visibility of the other's arms purchases and reduce tension.¹³⁰

Both countries have made mildly bellicose statements. President Fujimori has stated that Peru is, "a peaceful country that respects treaties, but we will not fail to answer aggressions and provocation's."¹³¹ GEN Moncayo, Chief of the Joint Command of the Ecuadoran Armed Forces stated that, "The country wants peace with Peru, but the entire nation is on alert and the military sleeps with one eye open."¹³²

Deposed President Bucaram alleged that General Moncayo has prepared an attack plan, "The Dignity Plan," against Peru. He accused General Moncayo of being a "psychopath who is bothered that peace may come to Ecuador and Peru." Bucaram said Moncayo engineered his ouster from the Presidency because he did not like Bucaram's pacifist tendencies.¹³³ The Ecuadoran media allegedly uncovered a secret Peruvian plan, "The Victory Plan,"--whose purpose was to reinforce Peru's military, incorporating lessons learned from the 1995 conflict. .

form North Korea. The SCUD-B has a range of 160 to 280km in, "Magazine Reports Peru to Buy North Korean Missiles," *Vistazo*, in FBIS Latin America, 21 March 1997. Peruvian military sources denied the report saying that this was "an ill-intentioned and irresponsible report seeking to mar the bilateral talks," in "Military Deny Magazine Report on Purchase of DPRK Missiles," *Lima Gestion*, in FBIS Latin America, 26 March 1997. Ecuador purchased four Kfir fighter planes from Israel in January 1996. The US had to sanction this transaction because the planes were equipped with US manufactured General Electric Company engines. Peru objected to the US apparent support of this arms build-up, particularly since the US was one of the four Guarantors overseeing the peace agreement. Ecuadoran officials claimed that the Kfir purchase had been programmed prior to the 1995 conflict and it was made in order to replace outdated equipment, in News Digest for January 1996, "Ecuador, Jet Sale Renews Tensions With Peru." Facts on File, p.74. US Ambassador Einaudi described the Kfir purchase as only "one for one replacements that introduced no new technology." But Ambassador Einaudi also recognized that even "minimal acquisitions could be perceived as threatening...and raise fears of a South American arms race," in Einaudi, p.72. Unidentified Peruvian officials had charged that Peru created an uproar over this deal to divert attention from its own arms buildup, in, News Digest for January 1996, "Ecuador, Jet Sale Renews Tensions With Peru." Facts on File, p.74. Fujimori said that "Peru does not need to purchase weapons, what we are doing is modernizing, updating, just maintaining the balance." In, "More on Fujimori's Comments," *Lima Television Network*, in FBIS Latin America, 18 December 1995, p.41.

¹²⁹ "SENACOM Charges Peru Engaged in 'Gigantic' Arms Race," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 19 December 1995, p.32.

¹³⁰ "Ecuador: 'Understanding' Reached to Control Arms Procurement," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 14 May 1997.

¹³¹ "Fujimori Not to Give 'An Inch' of Territory," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 3 May 1995, p.41.

¹³² "Ecuador: Moncayo: Ecuadorian Armed Forces Sleep With One Eye Open." *Guayaquil Expreso*, in FBIS Latin America, 4 May 1997.

¹³³ The Ecuadoran Ambassador to Lima Horacio Villa insisted that "it is absolutely false that Ecuador has prepared an attack on Peru," and that Bucaram's "Dignity Plan," is a hoax. In "Ecuadoran Envoy Denies Bucaram reports of Arms Buildup," *Mexico City NOTIMEX*, in FBIS Latin America, 23 April 1997.

Both Ecuador and Peru have been building up the transportation and communications infrastructure in and around the frontier.¹³⁴ Peru created a new military region on the border, the 6th Military Region. This command brings the Air Force and Army under one joint command, a lesson learned from the conflict after Peruvians evaluated sub-Air Force and Army coordination as sub-par.

Ecuador and Peru have made mutual accusations of planting mines on the border. In March 1997, the Ecuadorans accused the Peruvians of planting mines. Ecuador claims to have deactivated 4,400 Russian and Czech-made mines on the border (Ecuador does not use Russian or Czech mines).¹³⁵ In May 1997, Peru captured a seven man Ecuadoran patrol they claim was 6 kilometers inside Peruvian territory. This patrol allegedly was carrying 60 antipersonnel mines and sketches for the emplacement of those mines.¹³⁶ Ecuador says that their men were demining the area, not planting mines.¹³⁷

These military developments, rather than a show of disdain for the peace process, could be interpreted as simply prudent steps taken by both defense establishments to maintain a general preparedness for unforeseen contingencies.

Countries must have demarcated, uninterrupted, and stable borders.

Ambassador Luigi Einaudi
US Special Envoy to Peru-Ecuador Negotiations¹³⁸

A "demarcated, uninterrupted and stable" border would bring the Peru-Ecuador rivalry to an end. The historical Peruvian and Ecuadoran stances may be difficult to overcome. Ecuador maintains that the prevailing impasse is a delimitation problem, while Peru upholds that the problem is in demarcation, a demarcation over a borderline already established in the Rio Protocol.

Ecuadorans see themselves as victims of historical injustice. Maps posted in classrooms and school textbooks assert that the original national territory was reduced by two-thirds. The motto "Ecuador is an Amazon country and always will be" is displayed in all public places.¹³⁹

Peru feels that Ecuador has purposely distorted the historical events to gain world sympathy for their cause. Peru feels that Ecuador is asking for territory that does not belong to them. President Fujimori has said that "We will not give an inch of the border.

¹³⁴ "Efforts to Remedy Neglect of Border Region, *Quito HOY*, in FBIS Latin America, p.20.

¹³⁵ "Ecuadoran Army Claims Peru Plants Mines on Border," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 27 March 1997. Peruvian Ambassador to Ecuador Hugo Palma denied this action is taking place in "Military Leader Says Peru Planted Antipersonnel Mines," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 13 March 1997.

¹³⁶ "Peru: Defense Ministry on Capture of Ecuadorian Soldiers," *Lima America Television Network*, in FBIS Latin America, 19 May 1997.

¹³⁷ "Peru Returns Captured Ecuadorian Soldiers," *Quito Voz de Los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 19 May 1997. And "Ecuadorian Source: Peace Not Affected 'At All' by Incident," *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 14 May 1997.

¹³⁸ "Approach of US State Department Envoy Praised." *El Comercio*, in FBIS Latin America, 29 March 1995, p.36.

¹³⁹ Marcella, pp.5,25.

It must be clearly understood that we will definitely not accept any attempt to get a sovereign outlet to the Amazon. This is our historic and constant position, respectful of international law and firm in the face of any aggression.”¹⁴⁰

A possible mutually acceptable alternative is the proposal to create a bi-national ecological park administered by both countries along the 78 kilometer disputed zone. Conservation International calls the Cenepa “one of the most biologically diverse areas of the planet.”¹⁴¹ This proposal offers a “face-saving” solution to the impasse.

However, a 1993 geological study supposedly establishes the existence of major gold deposits of about 400 million metric tons on the Peruvian side of the Condor Mountain range.¹⁴² If this report is valid, Peru would be less likely to grant concessions to Ecuador or environmentalist proposals for an ecological park. .

For the time being, the status quo may be an acceptable alternative.¹⁴³ Status quo means no bloodshed. Under the current MOMEPA supervised DMZ, the Peruvians are keeping the Ecuadorans out of the Cenepa and the Ecuadorans are keeping hope that diplomacy may grant them concessions.

¹⁴⁰ “Fujimori Not To Give ‘An Inch’ of Territory,” *Madrid EFE*, in FBIS Latin America, 3 May 1995, p.41.

¹⁴¹ “Peru, Ecuador: Environmental Issues in Border Area Noted,” *Lima Caretas*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 May 1997.

¹⁴² “Gold Deposits Discovered on Border With Ecuador,” *Buenos Aires Noticias*, in FBIS Latin America, 1 September 1995, p.40 and “Peru, Ecuador: Environmental Issues in Border Area Noted,” *Lima Caretas*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 May 1997.

¹⁴³ Diehl, pp.102-103.

Future of MOMEP.

The commitment of American soldiers must be of limited duration with a stated and achievable exit strategy.

Senator John McCain
Republican, Arizona¹⁴⁴

The observer mission was created by the Itamaraty Declaration, and this commitment will not end until all prevailing impasses are solved.

Marcelo Fernandez de Cordoba
Ecuadoran Foreign Ministry Secretary¹⁴⁵

This mission has created military conditions that could lead to a diplomatic settlement. This process must be given time to take root.

General Barry McCaffrey¹⁴⁶
Commander in Chief, US Southern Command

It is fashionable these days to say that UN peace operations should have to set deadlines. But does it make sense, therefore to pull the UN peacekeepers out of Cyprus and off the Golan Heights, risking war, simply because they have been there a long time? Should UN missions face arbitrary cut-off points even if they can be maintained at low cost and low risk, especially compared to the uncertain consequences of withdrawing them?

Edward C. Luck
Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping¹⁴⁷

MOMEP's exit strategy was to turn the peacekeeping mission completely over to the former belligerents. To date, Peru and Ecuador have fully supported the integration of their officers into MOMEP. However, neither Peru or Ecuador want to see a complete Guarantor withdrawal. Both parties feel they are not ready to go it alone.

Integration of Peruvians and Ecuadorans has allowed the US, Argentina and Chile to reduce their initial commitment of 10 observers down to four. Brazil, due to additional administrative responsibilities, continues to maintain a 10 man contingent. JTF Safe Border has downsized from an initial 72-man contingent to 59 men.

The four helicopters and 81 Guarantor soldiers cannot be described as a "quagmire." Belligerent funding makes Guarantor withdrawal even less pressing. MOMEP should be withdrawn when there is no longer a perceived need for them. If the

¹⁴⁴ McCain, p.89.

¹⁴⁵ "MOMEP To Meet in Quito 16 Nov. To Review Progress," *Quito Voz de los Andes*, in FBIS Latin America, 15 November 1995, p.54.

¹⁴⁶ McCaffrey, p.46.

¹⁴⁷ Luck, p.70.

there is a likelihood that belligerents would move quickly back into the DMZ to occupy old positions, then prolonged peacekeeping is preferable to renewed hostilities

The four guarantors appear committed to going the distance. The successful MOMEPE mission is a source of pride for the four countries. In March 97, when the Argentine media reported that Argentina might bail out of the peacekeeping mission, the Argentine Foreign Ministry immediately refuted the reports saying their "commitment to its duties as part of MOMEPE has never been in doubt."¹⁴⁸

Future of Joint Task Force Safe Border

Sometimes it's not large numbers, just like it's the small numbers of people that we have in Ecuador and Peru, that holds together that unzip point. Its "boots on the ground that makes a big difference.

General Dennis Reimer
Chief of Staff of the Army
7 January 1997

Although US Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) says that there should be no open ended commitments, the US will continue to support JTF Safe Border for the near future. As long as the mission continues to go well, there should be very little pressure to bring the personnel home. Should Brazil assume the support function as proposed, US figures will drop from 59 personnel to 15, lessening the pressure even further.

JTF Safe Border: Drawdowns and Handoffs

Contract Aviation.

Although a cost-effective alternative to military aviation, neither belligerent wants contract aviation. Both prefer to pay the additional costs for the distinctive MOMEPE signature of the US Blackhawk helicopters. Both want professional military pilots flying the observer missions. The parties fear that contract pilots may be sub-par performers, or may come with a bias towards one of the countries.

Brazilian Assumption of Helicopter Mission.

The Brazilians have offered to assume the JTF Safe Border mission, minus the communications requirement and the USAF weather station. The Brazilians are purchasing US Blackhawk helicopters and will train pilots through contract instructors. The Brazilians, however, will not have the stand-off maintenance support capability, like the 1-228th Aviation had in Howard Air Force Base, Panama. This off-site maintenance support allowed MOMEPE to keep maintenance personnel and resource requirements down to a bare minimum.

¹⁴⁸ "Foreign Ministry Reaffirms Commitment to MOMEPE," *Buenos Aires TELAM*, in FBIS Latin America, 10 March 1997.

Special Forces.

Foreign Area Officers (FAO) are now working in the MOMEP mission to fulfill requirements for in-country training. These FAO officers are in addition to, not in lieu of, the Special Forces officers currently filling the observer positions. The FAO officers are exposed to five Latin American countries simultaneously, while gaining practical experience from working on a regional peacekeeping mission. Once FAO officer participation becomes routine, they may begin to assume the observer positions, allowing the Special Forces officers to return to their operational units.

Communications.

The US communications element will remain in Patuca for the foreseeable future. The installation of a Motorola repeater system in the Patuca-DMZ area has been suggested as a means to free up the communications hardware. The overall reduction in personnel and equipment could be negligible since MOMEP will still need a back-up communications system, and long-range communication for Panama, Bagua, Quito, Lima, and Brasilia. Puerto Rican National Guard personnel have also been suggested as replacements for the Special Forces radio operators.

CONCLUSIONS

Complete settlement is the ultimate measure of success.

JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations¹⁴⁹

For peacekeeping operations the definition of success is to create and maintain the arrangements by which the parties can live peacefully while they develop trust and seek to work out long term political stability.

DR David S. Alberts and DR Richard Hayes
Command Arrangements for Peace Operations¹⁵⁰.

MOMEP did not bring the Peru-Ecuador dispute to a "complete settlement," but MOMEP did create the environment that has allowed those negotiations to take place. MOMEP was designed to observe the cease-fire, not achieve diplomatic success. The cease-fire has been holding for 30 months. The final peace will have to be made by the diplomats.

MOMEP demonstrated that regional peacekeeping organizations have distinct advantages. MOMEP's homogeneity, situational awareness, and language capability, allowed them to relate to the crisis in a more efficient and informed manner. MOMEP's awareness of cultural sensitivities gave them the tools to integrate the former belligerents into the peacekeeping force. MOMEP also demonstrated that US leadership is not always

¹⁴⁹ JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, p.6.

¹⁵⁰ Albert and Hayes, p.74.

required or desirable. Brazil's leadership role gave the organization a marked regional flavor and became of form of burden sharing. MOMEP showed that a flat, highly autonomous, readily accessible, organization is a responsive organization. Finally, MOMEP demonstrates that a close working relationship between the diplomatic and military peacekeeping efforts enhances the overall effort.

MOMEP observers came to the mission with an in-depth understanding of the historical background of the conflict and the politico-military situation. The learning curve was not steep. Through proper personnel selection (US Special Forces and Foreign Area Officers), the US personnel in MOMEP were as regionally qualified as their Latin American counterparts.

Spanish as the single common language greatly enhanced the efficiency, effectiveness of the peacekeeping force. Operations, diplomacy and negotiations were simplified, and misunderstandings minimized.

MOMEP treated the former belligerents with trust and confidence. This cooperation paved the way for the integration of Peru and Ecuadoran observers into the mission. MOMEP's cultural finesse enabled them to convince the belligerents that integration was in their best interests.

The MOMEP Staff were both the planners and the executors. MOMEP's flat and autonomous organization gave the "man on the ground" the widest latitude in making operational decisions. The MOMEP Staff developed and approved their own plans on the spot. This quick response time gave MOMEP the initiative.

Satisfactory solutions were more forthcoming when the Guarantor diplomats took advantage of the professional insights gained by the MOMEP Staff. MOMEP helped bridge the gap between the diplomats political sensing and the reality on the ground.

JTF Safe Border provided MOMEP with the technology that allowed them to control observer teams over a widely dispersed area. JTF Safe Border gave MOMEP battlespace awareness, allowing them to make timely and accurate decisions of the belligerent situation.

JTF Safe Border accomplished the mission with a minimum amount of resources by making maximum use of host nation assets, by having C27 delivered logistics at their doorstep, and by having an off-site and on-call support base at US military installations in nearby Panama.

JTF Safe Border's Spanish speaking soldiers had the versatility to conduct both JTF Safe Border support functions and peacekeeping duties as necessary. This direct interface with MOMEP and the former belligerents built bonds of trust, accelerated MOMEP cohesion, and facilitated the peace process.


JTF Safe Border provide MOMEP with an immediate support base, alleviating much of the disorganization and inefficiency normally expected in a multinational organization. By organizing JTF Safe Border around the standing headquarters of a Special Forces Battalion, it was built on a foundation of personnel comfortable working together. This unit cohesion was particularly helpful during the start up of the mission, as observers from four countries scrambled to get organized. Special Forces also had the maturity, familiarity with Latin American militaries and the ability to function in ill-defined situations. They could operate well in remote and austere areas like the Cenepa.

MOMEF worked hard to maintain the perception of impartiality throughout the mission. They recognized that the variable , “level of impartiality” needs to remain constant throughout the mission.

MOMEF directed their force protection efforts against the natural hazards presented by the Upper Amazon. The lightly armed peacekeepers fostered trust among the former belligerents, contributing to the accelerated integration of the parties into the peacekeeping force. This also resulted in a reduced troop presence for MOMEF.

Finally, MOMEF enjoyed success because it was introduced into the right kind of conflict. MOMEF enjoyed a high level of consent from the belligerents, the dispute was an interstate conflict, the border zone was sparsely populated, there was no NGOs with conflicting agendas, and MOMEF did not have to react to the “CNN effect.” These environmental characteristics made it easier for MOMEF to conduct peace operations and verify that the parties were in compliance with the accords.


MOMEPII ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Structure of U. S. Contingent: 9 Sep 95

72 Total Personnel


- * Sourced by SOCSO
- ** Sourced by USARSO
- *** Sourced by SOUTHAF



PERU / ECUADOR BORDER DISPUTE

SOUTHCOM JF


COLOMBIA



Peru

- International boundary
- Department boundary
- ★ National capital
- ⊙ Department capital
- Railroad
- Road


Callao is the capital of the Constitutional Province of Callao which has the status of a department but is too small to be shown on this map.




Transverse Mercator Projection, DM 71° W



ECUADOR - PERU CONFLICT DMZ AND ZONE A





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